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ABSTRACT
In early 2013, a group of similarly situated individuals gathered to discuss how they
could defend themselves against a grave potential injustice. Time was of the essence, so
they would need to act quickly to preserve their rights. Fortunately, their path to justice
was already paved: the matter was pending in federal court, and each had standing to
appear and be heard. But frustratingly, this seemingly well-paved path was barred to them.
These individuals, who were technically parties to the proceeding, were virtually invisible
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to the court and largely disenfranchised in settlement negotiations. Striving to overcome
these obstacles, they persisted in their efforts to unite and gain a collective voice in the
proceedings. Throughout the summer, the group organized meetings, events and actions;
they penned heartfelt letters to the judge and entered dozens of documents on the case
docket. But despite these efforts, the court denied their requests for formal representation
in the case and, shortly thereafter, approved a settlement that terminated their interests.
Meanwhile, evidence surfaced to confirm their worst fears: others stood to profit
handsomely from the settlement. Needless to say, these events have left a profoundly
negative impression on these individuals. They believe that the legal system not only failed
to protect their most basic procedural and substantive rights, but in fact served as an
instrument of economic inequality and social injustice. These individuals were common
shareholders of the iconic, publicly traded Eastman Kodak Company during its Chapter
11 bankruptcy reorganization. Many lost their life savings; all lost their trust in the U.S.
financial markets and courts of law. This Article takes up their cause, providing the first
empirical investigation and academic theorization of grassroots shareholder activism in
large commercial bankruptcies.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, individual shareholders of large and distressed publicly traded
corporations in Chapter 111 bankruptcy have increasingly engaged in direct action and
grassroots organization in their efforts to influence the restructuring. 2 By "direct action"3
I mean personal involvement in the Chapter 11 case as a "party in interest," 4 generally on
a pro se basis, by filing motions, making formal appearances at court hearings, and taking
other steps to be heard on issues pertaining to a corporate debtor's restructuring. By
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2013) (providing for reorganizations and liquidations of bankrupt persons).
2. See, e.g., Matthew Daneman, Kodak Bankruptcy Plan Challenged by Shareholders, Retirees,
DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE (May 10, 2013),
http://roc.democratandchronicle.com/article/A2/2013051 1/BUSINESS/305100046/Kodak%20bankruptcy
(describing direct action by individual shareholders in Eastman Kodak Company's bankruptcy); Bess Levin, Day
Trading Hipster Takes on David Tepper, DEALBREAKER (June 13, 2011), http://dealbreaker.com/2011/06/day-
trading-hipster-takes-on-david-tepper/ (reporting on the steps taken by an individual retail investor to appear and
be heard in Washington Mutual's bankruptcy); Troy Racki, WaMu Bankruptcy: Retail Investors Gain
Representation, SEEKINGALPHA.COM (Jan. 12, 2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/182093-wamu-
bankruptcy-retail-investors-gain-representation (describing grassroots efforts by Washington Mutual
shareholders to defend the appointment of an official equity committee).
3. In the context of grassroots activism and social movements, the term "direct action" traditionally refers
to nonviolent civil disobedience. See generally BARBARA EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PROTEST AND CULTURAL
REVOLUTION: NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION IN THE 1970s AND 1980s (1993) (discussing nonviolent direct action
to impact social change). But litigation can also be an instrument of direct action. See Lucie E. White, Mobilization
on the Margins ofthe Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 539
(1987) (exploring "the potential of welfare litigation to become an occasion for the education and mobilization of
poor people and their advocates").
4. In a Chapter 11 case, any "party in interest" may appear and be heard on any issue. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)
(2013). "Party in interest" includes "the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security's committee,
a creditor, an equity security holder [of the debtor], or any indenture trustee." Id.
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"grassroots organization" 5 I mean spontaneous and organic efforts to mobilize outside of
the legal structures 6 designed to protect stakeholder interests in large commercial
bankruptcies. 7 These activities include holding meetings, disseminating information,
collaborating to conduct research and prepare filings, and donating time, money, and in-
kind resources to advance restructuring outcomes that better preserve the rights of non-
insider holders of common stock in the debtor corporation.
Individual shareholders are engaging in direct action and grassroots organization
because they are almost entirely disenfranchised once a corporation enters bankruptcy.8 In
the case of an insolvent company, the board of directors no longer owes its fiduciary duties
exclusively to the corporation and its shareholders; instead, directors are generally
expected to maximize the value of the firm for the benefit of creditors, who have also
become residual stakeholders of the firm.9 Even when the debtor is solvent, managers
typically focus their efforts on gaining consensus to a Chapter 11 plan, often making
significant concessions to creditors at the expense of shareholders.1 0 Further compounding
matters, the U.S. Trustee and bankruptcy courts have grown hostile to shareholder requests
to appoint official equity committees in Chapter 11 proceedings,II making it very difficult
for widely dispersed shareholders to come together and gain a seat at the bankruptcy
negotiation table. 12
5. The term has been studied most often in the fields of political science and sociology. See generally
JEFFREY STOUT, BLESSED ARE THE ORGANIZED: GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2010) (exploring
modem-day progressive grassroots political organizing in the United States); ROBERT A. GOLDBERG,
GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (using sociological theory
and historical analysis to explore 20th century social movements).
6. These traditional legal structures include the debtor's management, official committees appointed to
represent similarly-situated claimants in bankruptcy, ad hoc groups and dominant shareholders, the bankruptcy
judge, the U.S. Trustee, and the SEC. See infra Part II (considering the limitations of traditional legal structures
that have the potential to advance the interests of shareholders).
7. By "large commercial bankruptcies," I mean those commercial bankruptcy cases that come within the
working definition of "mega cases" used by the Administrative Office of the U.S. courts: "extremely large case[s]
with: (1) at least 1000 creditors; (2) $100 million or more in assets; (3) a great amount of court activity as
evidenced by a large number of docket entries; (4) a large number of attorneys who have made an appearance of
record; and (5) regional and/or national media attention." LAURA B. BARTELL & S. ELIZABETH GIBsoN, A GUIDE
TO THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF BANKRUPTCY MEGA-CASES 5 (2d ed. 2009).
8. This observation is made in David L. Barrack et al., Shareholders Retain Significant Rights in
Bankruptcy: The Fight for Control of US. Energy Systems, Inc., J. CORP. RENEWAL (2008), available at
http://www.tumaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectlD=9658.
9. See infra Part II.A (discussing the possible shift in the corporate board's fiduciary duties in times of
corporate financial distress for the benefit of the firm's creditors). The principle is well-established in Delaware
corporate law. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del.
2007) (denying a right for creditors to bring direct fiduciary claims against directors, but recognizing the directors'
duty to maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it).
10. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (highlighting the debtor's "tendency to pacify large
creditors, with whom the debtor expects to do business, at the expense of small and scattered public investors").
11. See infra Part II.B (explaining the prevailing view that official equity committees are in most cases
unnecessary and inefficient).
12. The importance of assembling coalitions in order to gain a seat at the negotiation table is discussed in
Michelle M. Hamer & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business
Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1155, 1158-59 (2011).
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In this way, bankruptcy law magnifies the severe collective action obstacles that
shareholders already face under modem corporate law. 13 But in Chapter 11, the stakes are
often much higher. This is because the modem commercial bankruptcy reorganization
process relies upon party consensus rather than judicial edict, 14 meaning that claimants and
interest holders must have a seat at the negotiation table if they ever hope to defend their
rights and influence the proceedings.
In an attempt to overcome these and related challenges, a grassroots shareholder
movement has been taking shape. 15 Angry investors from around the world, who stand to
lose all or part of their life savings in prominent corporate bankruptcies, have taken to the
Internet to parse through the debtor's financial information, critique the proposed
restructuring plan and exchange information and expertise. 16 Many file their own motions
and supporting documents with the bankruptcy court, 17 and some even attend hearings and
make formal appearances in the case. 18 Meanwhile, others dedicate their time and
13. Collective action principles are generally explored in ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). These and related theories are
thoughtfully applied to the corporate shareholder context in ANDREAS JANSSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION AMONG
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS (2007).
14. Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter1] Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759,766 (2013).
15. It is difficult to ascertain exactly when the shareholder collective action this Article describes initially
became part of the corporate governance landscape. Similar grassroots activities were earlier observed among
retirees of large companies. See generally Jeff May, A T&T Retirees Protecting Benefits, DUKEEMPLOYEES.COM
- DUKE ENERGY EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE (June 13, 2003), available at
http://www.dukeemployees.com/retirees5.shtml ("Retirees of many of the largest U.S. companies have been
banding together to try to protect their benefits."). Such grassroots activism by retirees featured prominently in
the Enron bankruptcy proceedings. Given that the shareholders I encountered predominantly use the Internet to
stay abreast of the case, gather additional information, and interact with each other, I suspect that this particular
form of grassroots activism is a relatively new phenomenon, which has likely picked up steam in the wake of the
recent financial crisis and ensuing recession.
16. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. Message Board, YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/mb/EKDKQ/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (reflecting thousands of posts by self-
described individual shareholders of Eastman Kodak Company, exchanging information and analyzing financial
and legal consequences at each stage of the proceedings); WMI Holdings Corp. (WMIH) Message Board,
INVESTORS HUB, http://investorshub.advfn.com/WMI-Holdings-Corp-WMIH-l1133/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2014) (same, albeit with respect to the Washington Mutual Chapter 11 case).
17. See, e.g., In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (reflecting letters,
objections and other filings by individual shareholders on the docket); In re Washington Mut., Inc., Case No. 08-
12229 (Bankr. D. Del.) (same).
18. For instance, individual common shareholders attended and participated in hearings during Eastman
Kodak Company's Chapter 11 case. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing, In re Eastman Kodak Co., 2013 WL
4413300, Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (on file with the author); Transcript of
Hearing, In re Eastman Kodak Co., 2013 WL 4413300, Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2013) (on file with the author); see also Levin, supra note 2 (describing objections and court appearances by an
individual retail investor (the "day-trading hipster") in the Washington Mutual Chapter 11 case); Objection to the
Plan of Reorganization, filed by Nate Thoma, In re Washington Mut., Inc., Case No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del.
Nov. 19, 2010), ECF No. 6058 (articulating the investor's arguments).
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resources to maintaining websites, 19 transcribing information, and fundraising to support
the needs of similarly situated shareholders. 20
For the most part, these individuals are not part of the economic elite or the so-called
one percent.2 1 They are working- and middle-class persons who invested their life savings
in the stock market through retail brokerages or employer-sponsored retirement accounts.
And, while they clearly possess courage and conviction to intervene in the federal
bankruptcy proceedings of America's largest corporations, these shareholders are not
affluent persons with great influence. 22 Rather, they are ordinary people who recognize
that they are disenfranchised but refuse to be silenced; they hope that their collective efforts
will augment their individual voices.23
From a shareholder-rights corporate theoretical perspective, 24 grassroots shareholder
activism is an expression of democratic values in corporate governance; it is the
quintessential exercise of voice rather than exit. 25 In particular, grassroots shareholder
activists believe that today's commercial debtors are not necessarily insolvent such that the
restructuring process ought to presumptively exclude equity owners; rather, they believe
that large corporate debtors are able to creatively shield substantial economic wealth and
use it to reward preferred corporate stakeholders. 26 In this way, these activists strive to
19. See, e.g., Kodak General Board, KODAK-SHAREHOLDERS.COM, http://kodak.boards.net/ (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014) (establishing a web forum for individual shareholders of Eastman Kodak Company during the
pendency of the company's Chapter 11 case). Similarly, the now-defunct website, www.ghostofwamu.com,
served as an important information exchange tool throughout the Washington Mutual bankruptcy case. See, e.g.,
'Ghost of WaMu' posts 61-page expert valuation report, BVWIRE (Oct. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.bvlibrary.com/BVWire/bvwireArticles.aspx?docRef=1972 ("Started in 2009 by a former WaMu
shareholder who was 'burned' by the FDIC's seizure of the bank's billion-dollar assets, the site has served as a
central repository for the latest filings.").
20. Efforts to collect funds to pay attorneys and expert witnesses are detailed on a Kodak shareholder
message board. See, e.g., diamondrockvegas, Our Man Ahsan Zia wills set up a PayPal Account / GooglePay,
Kodak General Board, KODAK-SHAREHOLDER.COM, http://kodak.boards.net/thread/6175/ahsan-wills-paypal-
account-googlepay (last visited Nov. 29, 2014). One Eastman Kodak Company shareholder contributed $2000 to
hire an attorney to represent individual common shareholders in the company's Chapter 11 case. Interview with
Nancy Bo (Aug. 20, 2014) (on file with the author).
21. For an interactive resource, see Phil Izzo, What Percent Are You?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2011, 6:00
AM), http://blogs.wsj.comleconomics/2011/10/19/what-percent-are-youl.
22. In other words, they are not necessarily those generally described in MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND
INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2013).
23. The phrase "collective outbursts" describes collective behavior that is more transitory in nature,
happening in response to some event or situation. In contrast, "collective movements" are "collective efforts to
modify norms and values, which frequently (but not always) develop over long[] periods." NEIL J. SMELSER,
THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 3 (1962). The grassroots shareholder activism described in this Article can
be viewed as collective outbursts manifesting in a given case.
24. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 1637, 1641 (2013) (referring to the author's longstanding view that corporate law should protect and
promote "shareholder rights and engagement").
25. See generally ALBERTO. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (advancing a theory of economic, political, and social dynamics within
organizations).
26. Of course, to the extent distributions are made even though more senior claimants have not been made
whole, they are in violation of bankruptcy's absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C. § I 129(b) (2010). See also Ralph
Brubaker & Charles Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 60 U.
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underscore certain structural problems that are inherent in the commercial restructuring
process under Chapter 11: the tendency for certain privileged stakeholders with existing
market power to take control of the restructuring, shield wealth and extract excess returns
at the expense of other constituents;2 7 the failure of bankruptcy law's most vital safeguards
to fully take into account the intangible assets that drive modem restructurings, such as
intellectual property, litigation claims, and valuable tax attributes; 2 8 and the inherent
difficulty of valuing complex corporations and their assets.29
Of course, grassroots shareholder activism might also be viewed as a nuisance,
hindering an already protracted and costly commercial bankruptcy process. Nonetheless,
direct action, grassroots organization, and collective outbursts by angry, disenfranchised
shareholders should be understood as inevitable in today's large commercial restructurings.
This is because the legal process, as determined under U.S. bankruptcy and corporate laws,
harbors enormous structural strain. 30 Chapter 11 relies primarily on negotiated settlement
by powerful players, pitting the interests of average working- and middle-class persons
who own corporate stock against the interests of much larger stakeholders, such as
corporate insiders, dominant creditors, and activist venture capital funds that specialize in
distressed investments.
Individual shareholders serve as instruments of social change when they attempt to
organize and obtain a voice in Chapter 11 proceedings. Their efforts complement a global
social movement that decries unjust corporate enrichment and seeks to hold corporations
and others in positions of power accountable to ordinary citizens. 3 1 But grassroots
shareholder activism threatens the interests of those who have grown accustomed to
controlling corporate restructurings with little to no interference by widely dispersed
common shareholders. It also threatens to impose additional costs upon already distressed
companies, even potentially impairing long-term access to credit. For these reasons, the
topic deserves careful consideration. Although recent scholarly attention has been given to
ILL. L. REv. 1375, 1391 (2010) (referring to the absolute priority rule as "one of the most central, fundamental
distribution-value protections of a chapter 11 plan"). But if the corporation is solvent, any residual equity
rightfully belongs to the company's historic shareholders. The "magic" of bankruptcy is that through a confirmed
Chapter 11 plan, and without necessarily making a clear determination of the debtor's solvency, a debtor may
wipe out existing shareholders, make certain distributions, and emerge from bankruptcy with new shareholders,
who receive the company's residual value and the right to enjoy any future increases in value.
27. Dick, supra note 14, at 765.
28. Diane Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy's Corporate Tax Loophole, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2273,2307 (2014).
Professor Michelle Hamer recently tackles the problem of "soft variables" in commercial restructurings in
Michelle M. Hamer, The Value of Soft Variables in Corporate Reorganizations, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
29. See Kerry O'Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 403, 414-27 (2005) (highlighting the difficulty ofvaluing equity interests in a reorganized debtor).
30. On the role of structural strain, see SMELSER, supra note 23, at 47-66.
31. While there is no evidence linking grassroots shareholder activists to the Occupy Wall Street (OWS)
movement, their actions clearly advance the broader goals identified by OWS in its Principles of Solidarity. See
WRITERS FOR THE 99%, OCCUPYING WALL STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF AN ACTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA
22 (2011) (setting forth a narrative account of the movement). See generally DAVID GRAEBER ET AL., WE ARE
MANY: REFLECTIONS ON MOVEMENT STRATEGY FROM OCCUPATION TO LIBERATION (2012) (providing a social
movements analysis of the OWS movement).
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large and powerful activist shareholders, 32 on one hand, and to less powerful "citizen
shareholders," 3 3 on the other, grassroots activism by individual common shareholders in
large commercial bankruptcies has never been thoroughly investigated. In striving to fill
this void in the literature, this Article addresses the following questions: Why are individual
common shareholders resorting to grassroots organization and direct action? What specific
methods do they use? Finally, are direct action and grassroots activism effective ways to
influence Chapter 11 case outcomes? In practical terms, given that equity security holders
are often perceived as "wiped out" as a consequence of a company's bankruptcy filing,34
non-insider shareholders probably have little to lose from direct action and grassroots
activism. But do they actually benefit from these attempts to organize and influence the
proceedings? And, from a normative perspective, should the law discourage or facilitate
their participation in the case?
This Article addresses these and related questions through empirical investigation. It
focuses mainly on a single case study, the recent bankruptcy reorganization of the iconic,
publicly traded Eastman Kodak Company. 35 In particular, it analyzes qualitative data
gathered through direct observation of grassroots shareholder activism, in-depth interviews
with several activist shareholders, and dozens of written documents produced and
disseminated by activists. Such in-depth, qualitative analysis of grassroots shareholder
activism contributes to a broader understanding of corporate relations, even beyond the
bankruptcy arena. In particular, the study sheds new light upon the essential characteristics
of equity investment in the modem corporation, 36 such as the separation of ownership and
32. Studies tend to focus on investors, such as hedge funds, who acquire large stakes in publicly traded
corporations. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 24 (considering arguments for and against insulation of boards from
powerful, activist shareholders). See generally April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder
Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187 (2009) (analyzing activist interventions by
powerful, activist shareholders); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (exploring activism by large institutional investors). For a recent
comparative analysis considering the roles hedge funds play in corporate governance, see Alexandros Seretakis,
Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons Learned from the American Experience, 8 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & CoM. L. 438 (2014).
33. Professor Anne Tucker uses the term to describe individuals who are indirectly invested in publicly
traded corporations through defined retirement plans. See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated
Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 Hous. L. REv. 153, 153 (2013); Anne Tucker, The Citizen
Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority ofAmericans Invest in the
Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1302-06 (2012).
34. The point is succinctly made by a popular investing columnist: "The most likely outcome [of a Chapter
11 case] is for the old stock to be canceled, effectively being wiped out, at the end of the bankruptcy process."
Paulo Santos, Understanding Bankruptcies As An Investor, SEEKINGALPHA.COM (Jan. 11, 2012, 2:30 AM),
seekingalpha.com/article/318759-understanding-bankruptcies-as-an-investor.
35. In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). The parent company and its
U.S. subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The cases were jointly administered as Case No. 12-
10202 (ALG) under the caption "In re Eastman Kodak Company." The debtors operated their businesses as
debtors-in-possession under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. All references in this Article to the "debtor"
in the context of Eastman Kodak Company refer collectively to all of the affiliated debtor entities.
36. By "modem corporation," I mean that which is described by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their
foundational work on post-industrial corporate organization. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY. (1932) (theorizing that when shareholders are too dispersed, agency
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control, while reminding us of the risks that are inherent in a commercial restructuring
process that empowers a few stakeholders to make decisions that impact the investments
of all others. Finally, it reignites the discourse on equity and fairness in the financial
markets, and highlights the importance of a more transparent and equitable commercial
restructuring process in carrying these principles through the entire life cycle of the firm.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II evaluates the traditional legal structures
that have the potential to advance the interests of the debtor's shareholders in large
commercial bankruptcies. Finding that these structures fail to offer adequate representation
to non-insider common shareholders, Part III explores grassroots shareholder activism as
a natural and spontaneous response to shareholders' collective action problem. Part III also
constructs a more nuanced understanding of grassroots shareholder activism in large
commercial bankruptcies by presenting the views of individual common shareholders
themselves, with particular attention to their methods and motivations. Part IV explores
various legal reforms that have the potential to provide formal representation to
shareholders in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, thereby improving the fairness and efficiency of
the commercial restructuring process. Part V concludes by reinforcing the argument that
individual common shareholders must have a meaningful opportunity to participate in large
commercial bankruptcies. Shareholders simply cannot protect their substantive rights
without a collective voice in the proceedings and a seat at the bankruptcy negotiation table.
II. BACKGROUND: THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES TO PROMOTE
SHAREHOLDERS' INTERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Whether within or outside of bankruptcy, shareholders of large, publicly traded
corporations face overwhelming collective action obstacles.37 For one thing, they tend to
be widely dispersed 38 and possess divergent economic interests. 39 Moreover, their interests
problems arise whereby managers tend to advance their own self-interests). See generally Adolf A. Berle, For
Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (further exploring these
arguments). Berle's conception of the modem corporation is carefully reconsidered in 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1009 (2012) (publishing the symposium articles from Berle III: Theory of the Firm, the Third Annual Symposium
of the Seattle University School of Law's Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Center on Corporations, Law & Society).
37. See Kelli Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 735 (2010) (exploring the collective action
obstacles faced by shareholders of large corporations, and proposing an "equity trustee" to better represent their
interests); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 616 (2006)
(acknowledging the overwhelming collective action obstacles confronted by shareholders of large corporations);
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 312
(1999) (also noting the pronounced collective action obstacles faced by shareholders of large corporations). See
generally supra note 13 (referencing collective action principles more broadly and with respect to corporate
shareholders).
38. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 36, at 47-48. The phenomenon, along with the attendant collective action
obstacles, are more recently observed in Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675 (2007).
39. The deeply fractured nature of ownership in the modem corporation has led some scholars to believe
that shareholders ought not to play a substantial role in governance. See generally Iman Anabtawi, Some
Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REv. 561 (2006) (arguing that increasing
shareholder power will not benefit shareholders generally because dominant shareholders often have private
interests that are in conflict with maximizing overall shareholder wealth); Bainbridge, supra note 37, at 632
(acknowledging the overwhelming collective action obstacles confronted by shareholders of large corporations).
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may deviate from those of the corporation and its managers. 40 These challenges are only
further amplified when a company faces financial difficulties. The following Subparts
consider the limitations of the traditional legal structures that have the potential to advance
the interests of shareholders of financially distressed firms, using examples from Eastman
Kodak and other recent large commercial bankruptcies.
A. The Debtor's Management
The corporate debtor's management-and in particular, its board of directors-is the
obvious starting place in any comprehensive review of the traditional legal structures that
have the potential to advance shareholders' interests. This is because under U.S. corporate
laws, 4 1 a board of directors manages the corporation. 42 While the board is responsible for
approving major corporate decisions, 43 it typically delegates daily managerial functions to
executive officers and advisors.44
Of course, a firm's managers may have their own divergent self-interests that cannot
be reconciled with the corporation's best interests. 45 In recognition of the inherent potential
conflicts, 4 6 courts adjudicating disputes of this sort typically opine that a solvent
corporation's board and officers owe fiduciary duties first and foremost to the shareholders,
as the firm's residual claimants (and thus the owners). 47 This means that managers are
40. Berle, supra note 36 (exploring these and related agency problems). See generally Leonard 1. Rotman,
Re-evaluating the Basis of Corporate Governance in the Post, Post-Enron Era, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (P. M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds., 2012) (exploring the disconnect between
shareholders' interests and the corporation's interests).
41. Corporations are governed by the laws of the state in which they are incorporated. Outside of Delaware,
most states model their corporation codes on some version of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a
proposed uniform code drafted by the American Bar Association Section of Business Law, Committee on
Corporate Laws. However, among public companies there is a persistent preference for Delaware as a state of
incorporation. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. &
EcoN. 383, 391 Table 2 (2002); Charles R. T. O'Kelley, Delaware Corporation Law and Transaction Cost
Engineering, 34 GA. L. REV. 929, 933 (2000) (citing empirical evidence of this enduring preference). As a result,
Delaware corporate law deserves special emphasis.
42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2013) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors"); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01 (2002); see also Cont'l Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (N.Y. 1912) (articulating the classic view
that corporate governance is vested in the board of directors).
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151-52, 251-66, 271-85 (2013); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2002).
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (2013); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.40, 8.41 (2002).
45. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 36, at 114; see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs & Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976) (noting
the inherent conflict of interest between potentially opportunistic managers and shareholders).
46. See Robert Flannigan, The Economics ofFiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 393 (2007)
(fiduciary accountability promotes the "the utility of the conventional proscription on self-interest"); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 752 (1997) (corporate
governance rules aim to prevent opportunistic behavior by self-interested managers).
47. See, e.g., Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1862) ("[Corporate managers]
hold a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with fidelity, not for their own benefit,
but for the common benefit of the stockholders of the corporation."); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09
(Del. 2009) ("[O]fficers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and ..
. the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors."). The rule is premised on the assumption that
9
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expected to engage in business decisions that are intended to maximize the value of the
corporation's common stock, even if this course of conduct fails to advance managers' self-
interests or the interests of the firm's other constituents, such as preferred stockholders,
creditors and employees. 4 8 Under most modem formulations of the corporate board's
responsibilities, directors owe a duty of care, candor and confidence, and must work
diligently on behalf of the corporation; 49 moreover, directors must resist conflicts of
interests. 50 According to a leading corporate theoretical paradigm, fiduciary duties of this
sort reduce the agency costs that arise when widely dispersed shareholders with profound
collective action obstacles defer authority and control to managers who may otherwise be
inclined to pursue their self-interests. 5 1 In essence, corporate law recognizes that the
mechanisms of corporate governance offer imperfect representation and relies upon
fiduciary principles to reduce the obvious risks to those who expose their capital
investments to the ultimate decision-making powers of a board.52
Board fiduciary duties may shift in times of corporate financial distress. This is
because when a corporation becomes insolvent, directors and officers are expected to
shareholders are the residual claimants-and thus the owners-of the firm. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73
A.3d 17, 40-41 (Del. Ch. 2013). ("To reiterate, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive in
good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual
claimants, the ultimate beneficiaries of the firm's value . . . ."). However, this "shareholder primacy" theory of
the firm has been called into question, most notably in Blair & Stout, supra note 37 (arguing that corporate boards
possess a broad range of discretion that can be used to advance the interests of many corporate constituencies).
48. See, e.g., Equity-Linked Investors, L.P., v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that a
corporation's board of directors owes fiduciary duties to the common shareholders, and owes only contractual
duties to its preferred stockholders. Also holding that "generally it will be the duty of the board, where
discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock ... to the interests created by
the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock, where there is a conflict."); see also Katz v. Oak Indus.
Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 882 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same, albeit with respect to bondholders rather than preferred
stockholders).
49. The duty of care owed by a corporation's board of directors is generally understood to mean "act[ing]
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). This means that directors must engage in substantial inquiry and/or seek
expert advice. Id.
50. For instance, managers may not engage in "self-dealing." See, e.g., Boston Children's Heart Found.,
Inc., v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429, 433-34 (1st Cir. 1996).
51. "Agency costs" include the costs of opportunism by managers with divergent self-interests, and the
costs of establishing and maintaining effective controls to prevent opportunism. These costs have been extensively
explored in the corporate literature. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings ofDelaware's Modern
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 3, 14-19 (2012) (considering the
relationship between corporate fiduciary duties and agency theories); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 45, at 305
(a foundational work exploring these concepts); see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs,
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1432-33 (1985) (exploring opportunistic behavior by
firm managers). Of course, this agency view of the firm is not the only theoretical paradigm. The prominent "team
production" theory of the firm suggests that the board exists to resolve high-level disputes about firm-specific
investments made by all corporate constituents, including but not limited to shareholders. See generally Blair &
Stout, supra note 37 (setting forth this theory of the firm). Under this approach, then, no legal support exists for
privileging shareholders above other constituents.
52. See generally supra note 45 and sources cited therein (noting the inherent conflict of interest between
potentially opportunistic managers and shareholders).
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consider the best interests of the firm's creditors and strive to maximize the value of the
company for all residual claimants, including creditors.5 3 This shift is premised upon
changing economic realities: creditors of an insolvent corporation bear a very real risk of
nonpayment, such that they unwittingly become residual beneficiaries of any increase in
value of the firm.
The problem, however, is that it is not always clear when a board's fiduciary
obligations have been realigned in situations of corporate financial distress. This is because
any such shift turns on the corporation's financial health, which can be difficult to discern
in the case of a complex business enterprise. 54 To best approximate a corporation's
financial condition for the purposes of identifying the beneficiaries of board fiduciary
duties, corporate law generally 55 recognizes two tests for insolvency: balance sheet
insolvency and cash flow insolvency. 56 The latter test examines the firm's ability to pay
its debts as they come due, 57 while the former compares the value of the firm's assets to
its liabilities.5 8
In practice, the realignment of traditional fiduciary duties to an expanded set of
beneficiaries in the event of insolvency does not necessarily reduce the agency costs to
shareholders or creditors. By grouping these investor classes together as co-beneficiaries
of board fiduciary duties, the rule fails to take into account the inherent conflicts among
these disparate stakeholders-particularly once the corporation enters bankruptcy.5 9 For
53. The principle is well-established in Delaware corporate law. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ.
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (acknowledging that when a corporation
becomes insolvent managers have a fiduciary duty to all residual claimants while holding that creditors of an
insolvent corporation do not have a right to assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty). See also Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 709 (1993) (explaining that "management 'owes' fiduciary duties to both
the creditors and the shareholders of an insolvent company, until their claims or interests are extinguished as part
of the reorganization case").
54. Most large corporations use the accrual method of accounting, which requires considerable amounts of
estimation and even speculation. See ASISH K. BHATTACHARYYA, ESSENTIALS OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 647-
48 (2011) (defining "accounting estimates" and "accrual convention").
55. As recently argued by attorneys for the prominent Delaware commercial law firm, Richard, Layton &
Finger, Delaware courts apply these tests inconsistently. See Robert J. Steam, Jr. & Cory D. Kandestin,
Delaware's Solvency Test: What Is It and Does It Make Sense? A Comparison of Solvency Tests Under the
Bankruptcy Code and Delaware Law, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 165, 165-66 (2011).
56. Id. at 174-83 (describing the tests as articulated in Delaware corporate jurisprudence).
57. See, e.g., Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639, at
*3 (Del. Ch. 2005) (using both the cash flow test and the balance sheet test to analyze corporate solvency). Also
referred to as "equitable insolvency," the cash flow test has been recommended by the World Bank where
countries have chosen to include an insolvency requirement in their bankruptcy laws. See, e.g., WORLD BANK,
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS 1 90 (2001)
(arguing for a corporate solvency test which balances competing interests).
58. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992) (using the balance sheet
test). This is also the test used for federal bankruptcy purposes. See infra note 132 (defining insolvency under the
bankruptcy code).
59. Such conflicts are explored in Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate
Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469 (2011) (outlining the conflicts among management, shareholders
and creditors in bankruptcy); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 53, at 709 (acknowledging that "the law of
fiduciary duty does not provide a reliable way for either creditors or shareholders to check management when it
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instance, in the typical bankruptcy reorganization, management's primary goal may be to
preserve the company as a going concern and obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan: a
task that generally requires making concessions to some classes of claimants and interest
holders at the ultimate expense of others. 60
A corporation may file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection without necessarily
meeting either or both insolvency tests. This is because, with the exception of municipal
debtors, persons who seek federal bankruptcy protection are not required to be insolvent.61
In these situations, shareholders are still the exclusive beneficiaries of managers' fiduciary
duties under state corporate laws. 62 Bankruptcy law, by and through its broad mandate that
the debtor take steps to maximize its value, 63 merely reinforces these fiduciary obligations.
Nonetheless, whether a firm is solvent or insolvent, shareholders typically fare poorly
in Chapter 11 cases, for reasons that do not simply reflect economic realities. 64 For one
thing, as drafters of the Bankruptcy Code 65 acknowledged, there is a "natural tendency of
a debtor in distress to pacify large creditors, with whom the debtor would expect to do
business, at the expense of small and scattered public investors." 66 For instance, early in
Eastman Kodak Company's recent bankruptcy case, the debtor and its managers assumed
acts in an otherwise appropriate manner on matters with regard to which the interests of creditors and shareholders
conflict").
60. Over the years, policymakers, scholars and judges have disagreed as to whether debtors tend to favor
creditors or shareholders. See, e.g., In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 407 B.R. 211, 218 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 2009) (noting
that debtors tend to make concessions to creditors at the ultimate expense of shareholders); Raymond Nimmer,
Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J.
1009, 1060 (1987) (asserting that shareholders have indirect influence over the debtor and its management,
enabling them to bargain for excess returns); see also infra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the
Bankruptcy Code drafters' view that debtors are more likely to align with creditors). In their influential empirical
project, Professors LoPucki and Whitford found that in 43 large commercial cases, management's orientation was
highly complex and also "clearly a function of the company's solvency. The managements of solvent companies
never aligned with creditors, while the managements of insolvent companies did so frequently." LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 53, at 745. But it is important to note that in all five of the cases in their study in which
management aligned with shareholders, an active shareholder owning a large block of stock also served as a board
member. Id. at 746. Perhaps in light of this alternative explanation for managerial alignment with shareholders,
the authors concluded that, in general, "creditors often exert considerable control over a reorganizing company."
Id. at 713.
61. The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated this principle in In re Marshall m, 721 F.3d 1032, 1069 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that Congress validly exercised constitutional power by allowing a debtor who is solvent to enter
bankruptcy); see also Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REv. 960, 1019 n.230 (2012) (noting that only Chapter 9 Bankruptcy imposes a solvency requirement).
62. Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (establishing that the debtor in possession has all the rights and obligations of a
trustee); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 573 (3d Cir.
2003) (noting the "trustee's fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate").
64. See generally Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV.
83 (2007) (exploring the difficulties of applying state corporate fiduciary law in the federal bankruptcy context);
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 53, at 673 (detailing the complex ways in which managers control corporate
restructurings, and acknowledging that "creditor and shareholder influence over management frequently prevents
companies from maximizing their value").
65. All references herein to the Bankruptcy Code are to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq.).
66. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 5796 (1978).
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an adversarial stance in response to shareholders' efforts to gain a seat at the negotiation
table.67 As a result, many shareholders came to believe that management had abandoned
their interests entirely. 68 A similar criticism was leveled years earlier by shareholders of
Northwest Airlines Corporation, who argued that "the central issue in this case . .. is that
the Debtors have abandoned their public stockholders in all respects." 69
Moreover, the modem commercial bankruptcy reorganization process under Chapter
11 privileges claimants with market power in the capital and securities markets, who are
able to take control of the case and steer the restructuring towards an outcome that best
advances their own interests. 70 The debtor's widely dispersed common shareholders are at
a profound disadvantage unless they can find some way to counter this power. And yet, as
the following Subpart explores, the modem commercial bankruptcy process under Chapter
11 does little to supplement corporate law when it comes to providing formal representation
to the debtor's shareholders. Rather, bankruptcy law erects an even higher barrier against
shareholder participation in negotiations.
B. Official Committees to Represent Claimants in Bankruptcy
Once a corporation files for bankruptcy protection, bankruptcy law, in addition to state
corporate law, governs relations between and among the debtor's stakeholders. In a
Chapter 11 case, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the U.S. Trustee 71 to appoint one or more
official committees to represent persons with an interest in the debtor's estate,72 such as
creditors and equity security holders.7 3 An official equity committee is generally
comprised of persons holding the "seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor
of the kinds represented on such committee." 74 Members of the committee are expected
to, among other things, retain professionals to represent the committee, 75 investigate the
debtor's affairs, and assist with the preparation of a Chapter 11 plan. 76 Under bankruptcy
law, those who serve on official committees owe fiduciary duties to the investors they
represent.7 7
67. See, e.g., infra note 102 and source cited therein.
68. See, e.g., Subzeroooo, Shareholders'Interest Looked After by BOD...rny a$$ (Sept. 5, 2013, 4:12 PM),
http://kodak.boards.net/thread/6535/shareholders-interest-looked-after-bod (unequivocally expressing this
sentiment on a shareholder message board).
69. Statement of Ad Hoc Committee Withdrawing Motion for Official Equity Comm. at 2, In re Northwest
Airlines Corporation, Case No. 05-17930 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2007), ECF No. 5086.
70. Dick, supra note 14, at 789.
71. By "U.S. Trustee," I mean the appropriate U.S. Trustee Office responsible for administering a
bankruptcy case. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 586 (establishing 21 regional U.S. Trustee Offices).
72. The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate that includes "all legal or equitable interests in
property of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1102.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2). Such persons must also be "willing to serve." Id.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c).
77. See In re Smart World Techs., LLC, 423 F.3d 166, 175 n.12 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[A] creditors' committee
owes a fiduciary duty to the class it represents."); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 919, 924 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("[A] holder of a claim or an equity interest who serves on a committee undertakes to act in a fiduciary
capacity on behalf of the members of the class he represents.").
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In Chapter I1's legislative history, Congress explained that official committees were
designed to be "the primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of the plan of
reorganization."7 8 In most large and complex restructuring cases, having an official
committee means that a certain class of stakeholders is invited to the negotiation table.
When equity owners in particular are invited to the negotiation table, it is highly likely that
shareholders will settle their claims. As Professors Lynn LoPucki and William Whitford's
comprehensive empirical study of commercial bankruptcies under Chapter 11 revealed,
plan proponents successfully negotiated with the official equity committee-meaning that
they gained the committee's consensus to the Chapter 11 plan-in 91% of observed cases
in which such a committee existed. 7 9
For these reasons, Eastman Kodak Company shareholders believed that having an
official equity committee would enable them to effectively organize and participate in the
company's restructuring. When the company entered bankruptcy in January 2012, it had
approximately 270 million shares of common stock issued and outstanding. 80 Like any
widely held public company, individual retail and retirement investors owned many of the
debtor's common equity shares. But despite the magnitude of the common shareholder
class, the U.S. Trustee appointed only a creditors' committee.8 1 This is because, while the
U.S. Trustee is obligated to appoint an official committee of unsecured creditors in Chapter
11 cases,82 the appointment of an official committee of equity security holders is
discretionary under the Bankruptcy Code.83
In the weeks following Eastman Kodak's bankruptcy petition, a group of common
shareholders-mostly hedge funds-sent letters to the U.S. Trustee requesting the
appointment of an official equity committee. 84 Following the U.S. Trustee's denial in
February 2012,85 these large and relatively powerful shareholders next filed a motion
asking that the presiding U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
78. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 401 (1977).
79. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization ofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 138 (1990).
80. Voluntary Petition of Eastman Kodak Co., at 4, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1.
81. Appointment of Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, at 1, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-
10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2012), ECF No. 115.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) ("[Tihe United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims.").
83. Id. ("[The United States trustee ... may appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity security
holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate."). See In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that U.S. Trustees have broad discretion to appoint additional official committees).
84. See Kodak S'holders' Joint Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of an Official Comm. of
Equity Sec. Holders, at 2, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012),
ECF No. 545 [hereinafter Kodak S'holders' Joint Motion for Order] (stating that shareholder value entitlements
warranted the appointment of an official equity committee); see also Letter to Judge re: Joint Motion to Appoint
Committee of Equity Security Holders, at 1, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012), ECF No. 789 [hereinafter Letter to Judge] (stating that an individual common
shareholder lends his support to the joint motion).
85. See supra note 84 and sources cited therein (evidencing that while the shareholders claimed that they
lacked adequate representation in the case, the U.S. Trustee ultimately denied the shareholders' request to appoint
an official equity committee).
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review the matter de novo.86 In particular, moving shareholders argued that the evidence
strongly suggested that the company was solvent and therefore had significant equity value
to protect, and that shareholders were without adequate representation in the case because,
among other things, the company's management had "already evidenced its disinclination
towards shareholders by . . . vigorously opposing the appointment of an official equity
committee [and] predicating that opposition on a premature and unstudied conclusion that
equity is-and forever will be-out-of-the-money." 87 Consequently, moving shareholders
asked the court to order the U.S. Trustee to form an official equity committee.88 Although
such relief is permissible under the Bankruptcy Code, 89 the court denied the motion in June
2012 on the grounds that shareholders were adequately represented by the debtor's
management and by the creditor's committee, both of which were theoretically tasked with
the duty of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders,
including shareholders. 90
Denied a seat at the negotiation table and effectively relegated to the sidelines,
shareholders-large and small-anxiously awaited a draft Chapter 11 plan. Over a year
later, the debtor and its management unveiled a proposed Chapter 11 plan reflecting
negotiated settlements among the company and its creditors. 9 1 Upon reviewing the draft
plan, shareholders discovered that they would receive no distributions and that their equity
interests would be cancelled.9 2 While this restructuring outcome would be consistent with
bankruptcy's distributional norms and state corporate law if the debtor was in fact
insolvent, the debtor never actually proved that it was insolvent.9 3 Shareholders believed
the company was vastly undervalued, as its financial disclosures relied upon book, rather
than fair market, value. 94 In fact, the company's own plan-related disclosures touted its
"cash-generative businesses" and "excellent positioning to achieve volume and
profitability gains in the growth markets." 95 Because the draft Chapter 11 plan gave certain
of the company's creditors all of the equity in the reorganized company,96 some
86. Kodak S'holders' Joint Motion for Order, supra note 84, at 4-5.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. at 22.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
90. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202, 2012 WL 2501071, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2012).
91. See Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and its Debtor Affiliates, In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2013), ECF No. 3650 [hereinafter
Joint Chapter 11 Plan] (setting forth the debtor's draft plan of reorganization).
92. See id. at 29 (providing that "[n]o Holder of an Equity Interest in Kodak shall receive any Distributions
on account of its Equity Interest").
93. Shareholder Greg Armstrong raised this and related criticisms in his objection. Objection by Greg
Armstrong, S'holder (Pro Se) to the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak
Co. and its Debtor Affiliates, at 9, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug.
12, 2013), ECF No. 4737.
94. See infra notes 136 and 141 and accompanying text.
95. First Amended Disclosure Statement for Debtors' First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankr. Code, at 2, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June
24, 2013), ECF No. 4143.
96. On the treatment of creditors under the proposed plan, see Joint Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 91, at 26-
29. Shareholders believed the company was vastly undervalued because the debtor had disclosed only book
values, which did not reflect present economic realities. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. The ability of
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shareholders believed that these creditors stood to profit from the restructuring at their
expense. In essence, the draft plan underscored the true costs to shareholders of their
disenfranchisement throughout the case. And so, shareholders once again mobilized. But
although hedge funds initially advocated on behalf of shareholder interests, this time it
would be individual common shareholders carrying the torch-using Internet message
boards9 7 and online digital libraries98 to develop a defensive strategy and circulate
documents.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2013, individual shareholders engaged in a
grassroots effort to reignite the hedge funds' earlier petition for an official equity
committee. When the U.S. Trustee once again declined this request in June 2013,99
shareholders entered dozens of letters and motions on the docket, 10 0 asking the court to use
its broad powers to order the U.S. Trustee to appoint an official equity committee.10 1 The
debtor and its management, 102 the U.S. Trustee, 103 and the official creditors' committee
formally opposed these requests. 104
Following an August 2013 hearing,105 the court once again declined to order the U.S.
Trustee to appoint an official equity committee. 10 6 Refusing to accept the shareholders'
evidence of the debtor's potential solvency,10 7 the court declined to even acknowledge the
management and senior creditors to use Chapter 11 to extract excess returns in the form of equity security interests
in the reorganized debtor is detailed in Michael T. Roberts, The Bankruptcy Discount: Profiting at the Expense
of Others in Chapter 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 157 (2013).
97. KODAK SHAREHOLDERS.CoM, http://kodak.boards.net/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) (showing the forum
shareholders primarily used).
98. For instance, a Scribd.com user "stockboardguy" established a digital online library of over
100 documents pertaining to the case. See SCRIBD, http://www.scribd.com/stockboardguy/documents (last visited
Sept. 11, 2014).
99. Objection of the United States Trustee to Shareholders' Motion for an Order Approving the
Appointment of an Official Equity Comm., at 7, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 29, 2013), ECF No. 4468 [hereinafter Objection of the United States Trustee] (referencing
a letter dated June 4, 2013 from Tracy Hope Davis, U.S. Trustee, to each of the requesting pro se shareholders).
100. In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (evidencing such filings
on the case docket).
101. See, e.g., S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity Comm., In
re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013), ECF No. 4249 (motion from
shareholder requesting the court's appointment of an official equity committee); Objection of the United States
Trustee, supra note 99, at 7 (discussing letters to the U.S. Trustee urging the formation of an official equity
committee).
102. Debtors' Objection to S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity
Comm. at 1, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013), ECF No.
4503.
103. Objection of the U.S. Trustee to S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an
Official Equity Comm. at 1, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 29,
2013), ECF No. 4468.
104. Objection of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Motion for Appointment of Official
Committee of Equity Security Holders, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
July 31, 2013), ECF No. 4507.
105. Transcript of Hearing, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2013) (on file with the author).
106. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202,2013 WL 4413300, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013).
107. Id.
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need for formal equity representation. In closing remarks, the court seemed to characterize
these shareholders as mere sore losers: "The Shareholders who have commenced or have
joined in the current motion are apparently convinced that it cannot be possible that the
company in which they invested has fallen so far that there is so little value for unsecured
creditors and no value at all for shareholders." 10 8
In essence, Eastman Kodak Company shareholders were up against a prevailing view
that shareholders ought to be presumptively excluded from the negotiation table in Chapter
11 cases, as official equity committees are often unnecessary and might even be
dangerously inefficient. 109 Professors LoPucki and Whitford's empirical work in the early
1990s partially bolstered this view.110 The authors documented how equity committees
negotiate for shareholder distributions even when they apparently have no legal right to
share in the proceeds of the estate, as determined by the authors' calculation of property
distributions made or to be made as of the date of plan confirmation. 11 Although the
authors acknowledged that such distributions are in many ways the natural byproducts of
a restructuring process that encourages negotiated settlements, 112 they were also highly
critical of such "nuisance" settlements. 113 In an effort to improve the commercial
bankruptcy process, they recommended a "preemptive cram down" to narrow the parties
to a Chapter 11 proceeding. 114 Under their proposal, the bankruptcy court would, after
notice and a valuation hearing, "extinguish[] the interests of the shareholders of clearly
insolvent debtors. The purpose [would be] to prevent shareholders who have no plausible
claim to share in the distribution under the absolute priority rule from disrupting the
reorganization process in the hopes of obtaining such a share through negotiations."1 1 5 The
proposal sought to advance the common goals of controlling costs and reducing delays in
108. Id. at *3.
109. Courts have expressed skepticism towards official equity committees, questioning not only their
economic utility but also the genuineness of their motives. See In re Kalvar Microfilm, Inc., 195 B.R. 599, 601
(Bankr. D. Del. 1996) ("The late timing of the motion ties into the only remaining purpose of an equity committee
in this case, which would be to object to confirmation, and litigate the valuation issue. The aforementioned costs
associated with the formation of an equity committee cannot be justified in light of this purpose."); In re Heck's,
Inc., 112 B.R. 775, 803-04 (Bankr. S.D.W.Va. 1990) (accusing an official equity committee (and its retained
professionals) of engaging in inefficient conduct during the course of the Chapter 11 case), aff'd in part andrev'd
in part by In re Heck's Properties, Inc., 151 B.R. 739 (S.D.W.Va. 1992); In re Emons Indus., Inc., 50 B.R. 692,
694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Not every case with public shareholders warrants an equity committee. Nor is it
clear that when a committee is appointed but is unsuccessful in obtaining any benefit for shareholders under a
plan that creditors through the allowance of an expense of administration should be obliged to bear the burden of
the futile effort.").
110. The authors' series of articles included LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 53; LoPucki & Whitford, supra
note 79; LoPucki & Whitford, infra note 113.
111. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 79, at 143-58 (discussing why equity holders share in the
distributions).
112. LoPucki and Whitford acknowledge the importance of equity security committees in providing
representation for shareholders, and also note that the distributions to shareholders are reflective of a system that
encourages negotiated settlement rather than judicial edict in strict accordance with absolute priority. See id. at
190-94.
113. The authors clearly articulate their negative sentiments towards these distributions in Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 625, 625 (1991).
114. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 79, at 187-89; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 113, at 625.
115. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 113 at 625.
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large commercial bankruptcy cases, 116 erring on the side of protecting creditors from
further deterioration of the bankruptcy estate. 117 But it is important to note that for
Professors LoPucki and Whitford, the debtor's solvency was pivotal to the decision
whether to exclude shareholders: in their view, only those interest holders who are "clearly
under water ... [with] no reasonable probability that they will cease to be under water by
confirmation" 118 should be subject to the preemptive cram down. 119 In cases of solvent,
marginally solvent-or even potentially solvent debtors-equity owners presumably had
an important role to play in bankruptcy negotiations. In their view, the proposal was
"directed at a narrow range of cases."1 20
Although the proposal was never codified, if the decisions of the U.S. Trustee and the
bankruptcy court in Eastman Kodak are any indication, common shareholders in modem
commercial bankruptcy cases are presumptively excluded from the negotiation table and,
as a result, preemptively crammed down in most cases. This is because a recent
jurisprudential shift in bankruptcy law has further contributed to shareholder
disenfranchisement in large commercial reorganizations. Although the Bankruptcy Code
is silent as to the facts and circumstances that the U.S. Trustee ought to consider in handling
shareholder requests to appoint an official equity committee, the question has spawned a
complex body of judicial doctrine that is inconsistently applied by courts. Through this
murky jurisprudence, courts have attempted to balance the statutory right of equity security
holders to the appointment of a committee where "necessary" to achieve "adequate
representation,"1 2 1 with the much broader goal of an efficient and cost-effective
bankruptcy process. Costs are a concern because, as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York explained, official committee appointments are "closely
followed by applications to retain attorneys and accountants," 1 22 with such costs generally
116. On costs, see infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. Judicial sensitivity to costs in Chapter 11 is
more broadly considered in Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of
Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014).
117. For instance, courts have expressed a need to control all types of administrative expenses in bankruptcy
proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit articulated the view thusly: "Despite the expansiveness with which the
administrative expense category may be treated, such judicial construction is limited by the countervailing
doctrine that section 503 priorities should be narrowly construed in order to maximize the value of the estate
preserved for the benefit of all creditors." Varsity Carpet Servs., Inc. v. Richardson (In re Colortex Indus., Inc.),
19 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Otte v. U.S., 419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974)).
118. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 113, at 628 (articulating this insolvency threshold).
119. Professor LoPucki reaffirms this view in a subsequent work. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With
Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729, 755-56 (1993) ("We think the elimination from the bargaining process of
parties who have no legal right to share in the distribution can eliminate a good deal of unnecessary threats,
litigation, posturing and negotiating.").
120. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 113, at 647.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). Like many pivotal concepts in bankruptcy law, the phrase "adequate
representation" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
122. In re Saxon Indus. Inc., 39 B.R. 945, 947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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borne by the debtor's estate. 12 3 Similarly, there are less tangible burdens associated with
committee formation, such as delays and interruptions in the bankruptcy process.124
A multi-factor analysis has emerged, with courts generally considering the following:
the number of shareholders; 125 the case's complexity, as indicated by the debtor's capital
structure; 126 the case docket's magnitude or the contested nature of Chapter 11 plan
negotiations; 127 whether the tangible and intangible costs to the estate outweigh any
potential gains to shareholders from adequate representation;12 8 and whether the
proceeding already adequately protects shareholder interests. 129 Although no one factor is
intended to be dispositive, 130 courts typically focus the analysis on the debtor's solvency;
in other words, most judges are only willing to expose the bankruptcy estate to the costs of
an official equity committee when there is clearly equity to protect.131
But at or near the commencement of a case, it may be difficult to obtain a full and
complete picture of the debtor's financial condition. Although the Bankruptcy Code
mandates use of the ostensibly detached and objective balance sheet test to determine
whether a debtor is insolvent,132 the U.S. Trustee typically relies upon the debtor's own
financial disclosures in exercising its discretion to appoint an official equity committee.1 33
But financial disclosures that rely upon generally accepted accounting principles
123. 11 U.S.C. § 503. Under subsection (b)(2), professionals retained by an official committee are entitled
to administrative priority for payment of fees and expenses. Other professionals may be paid "reasonable
compensation" under subsection (b)(4) only if the services make a substantial contribution to the bankruptcy case.
124. See, e.g., Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 155, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (mentioning
intangible costs).
125. See, e.g., Thomas Henry Coleman & David E. Woodruff, Looking Out for Shareholders: The Role of
the Equity Committee in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 295, 298 (1994) (summarizing courts' consideration of this factor).
126. See, e.g., In re Edison Bros. Stores, Inc.,No. 95-13554, 1996 WL 534853, at *2 (D.Del. Sept. 17, 1996)
(considering the debtor's capital structure as evidence of the complexity of the case).
127. See, e.g., In re Wang Labs., Inc., 149 BR. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (evaluating the necessity of an
official equity committee).
128. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 116 B.R. 344, 345 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1990) (balancing the
interests of shareholders against the burden of additional costs).
129. See, e.g., In re Exide, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27210, at *4 (D.Del. Dec. 23, 2002) (holding that equity
holders must be adequately represented); Albero, 68 BR. at 159-61 (establishing the appropriate legal standard
bankruptcy courts must follow in the use of their discretion to appoint an equity committee); In re Beker Indus.,
55 B.R. 945, 947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (ordering the appointment of official committees to represent equity
and debenture holders.).
130. In re Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., No. 95-13554, 1996 WL 534853, at *3 (D.Del. Sept. 17, 1996) (stating
that the factors "are simply guidelines for the courts to consider and every case must be judged on its own facts");
see also In re Residential Capital, LLC, 480 B.R. 550, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing seven factors that
bankruptcy courts consider when deciding whether to appoint an official committee to ensure adequate
representation for the moving party); Matter of Kalvar Microfilm, Inc., 195 BR. 599, 600 (Bankr. Del. 1996)
(stating the factors that courts consider when deciding whether to appoint additional committees).
131. For instance, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York referred to the debtor's
solvency as the "threshold issue." In re Ampex Corp., No. 08-11094, 2008 WL 2051128, at * 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
May 14, 2008).
132. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a company is insolvent when "the sum of such entity's debts is greater
than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A).
133. The U.S. Trustee may conduct an independent valuation by, among other things, reviewing the debtor's
first-day filings and associated disclosures, as well as its most recent 8-K and 10-K filings.
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(GAAP),1 34 as they often do, may not give an accurate picture of the debtor's true
economic condition. 135 For example, as numerous Eastman Kodak Company shareholders
observed, the debtor's Chapter 11 plan-related financial disclosures recorded properties at
cost, net of accumulated depreciation, 136 rather than at their potentially much higher fair
market value. Similarly, certain corporate assets retain or lose value depending upon the
nature of the restructuring ultimately pursued; for instance, to the extent the debtor
possesses valuable tax attributes, its reorganization value may be much higher than its
liquidation value. 137 Moreover, the court may subordinate or recharacterize certain
liabilities as equity during the course of the bankruptcy case, 138 thereby dramatically
altering the debtor's financial picture. Finally, the debtor or its stakeholders can easily
manipulate financial data;139 the risk is particularly high with respect to court-mandated
bankruptcy disclosure forms, which do not fully take into account the complexity of
modem commercial assets and liabilities. 140 Perhaps in recognition of these and similar
issues, the debtor's financial disclosures in Eastman Kodak were replete with caveats that
the data may be incomplete, inaccurate or misleading.'41 Shareholders raised these and
134. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are uniform standards of, and guidelines to, financial
accounting and reporting. The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board are authorized by the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission to establish these principles.
Frequently Asked Questions, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
http://www.aicpa.org/About/FAQs/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2014).
135. See, e.g., In re Sierra Steel, Inc. v. Totten Tubes Inc., 96 B.R. 275, 278 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that there is no evidence that GAAP accurately determines insolvency); In re Wang Labs, Inc., 149 B.R. 1 (Bankr.
D.Mass 1992) (holding that the appointment of an official equity committee was necessary).
136. See, e.g., Objection by Greg Armstrong, S'holder (Pro Se) to the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and its Debtor Affiliates, at 12-15, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No.
12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), ECF No. 4737 (making objections to the methods relied upon
by the court to value Eastman Kodak's assets). The debtor principally calculated depreciation expense using the
straight-line method over the assets' estimated useful lives, which are typically ten to 40 years for buildings, and
three to 20 years for equipment.
137. See Dick, supra note 28, at 2273 (explaining that valuable tax attributes may be a unique asset that can
be preserved in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and directed to preferred stakeholders).
138. Bankruptcy courts may subordinate claims on equitable grounds. Pepper v. Linton, 308 U.S. 295, 305
(1939); see also I1 U.S.C. § 510(c) (permitting the bankruptcy court to subordinate, on equitable grounds, all or
part of a creditor's allowable claim).
139. For a lively account of the myriad possibilities, see generally HOWARD SCHILIT, FINANCIAL
SHENANIGANS: How To DETECT ACCOUNTING GIMMICKS & FRAUD IN FINANCIAL REPORTS (2010).
140. See Dick, supra note 28, at 2304 (providing the example that, "the omission of tax attributes from a
debtor's preliminary asset disclosures leads to information asymmetries as to the nature and extent of what may
be the debtor's most sizable asset").
141 Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for Eastman Kodak Company, at *34, In re Eastman Kodak Co.,
Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2012), ECF No. 887 (providing global limitations and
disclaimers with respect to the debtor's financial disclosures). For instance, the disclosure statement warns that
"inadvertent errors or omissions may have occurred" and that "there can be no assurance that these [financial
disclosures] are complete." Id. at *3. Under the heading "Valuation," the disclosure statement provides, "It would
be prohibitively expensive, unduly burdensome, and an inefficient use of estate assets for the Debtors to obtain
current market valuations of all of their assets. Accordingly . . . net book values as of December 31, 2011 are
reflected." Id. at *4.
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related arguments in their efforts to demonstrate that the debtor was not necessarily
insolvent. 142
Under an earlier line of cases, Eastman Kodak Company's shareholders would have
likely received a favorable response to their requests for an official equity committee. This
is because the dominant legal standard for appointment of an official equity committee
was, for many years, much more lenient toward shareholders, requiring only a limited
investigation of the debtor's solvency. 143 Precisely because of the vulnerable position the
debtor's equity security holders occupied, drafters of the Bankruptcy Code desired to
extend generous representation rights. For instance, legislative history reveals that
Congress believed it was "essential for [public investors] to have legislative assurance that
their interests will be protected," and that "[s]uch assurance should not be left to a plan
negotiated by a debtor in distress and senior or institutional creditors who will have their
own best interest to look after." 144 Recognizing the unique collective action obstacles faced
by shareholders, the drafters hoped that the appointment of an official equity committee
would counteract the tendency for debtors to appease creditors at the ultimate expense of
shareholders. 14 5 These protections were viewed as especially necessary during bankruptcy,
as reorganization proceedings are "literally the last clear chance to conserve for
[shareholders] values that corporate financial distress or insolvency have placed in
jeopardy."l 46
Accordingly, under the early standard, the debtor and/or its creditors had the burden
of proving that shareholders ought to be excluded from the negotiation table. The U.S.
Trustee was expected to affirmatively respond to shareholder requests to appoint an official
equity committee except where the debtor appeared to be "hopelessly insolvent."1 47 Cases
applying this standard frequently noted that shareholders did not need to be guaranteed a
distribution. Rather, shareholders need only make a showing that there is potential equity
value such that they are not necessarily "out of the money." 14 8 For instance, as the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts explained, the costs of equity
representation are justified where the debtor is even "marginally solvent." 149 Some early
decisions even reasoned that the debtor's demonstrated insolvency is not a bar to the
appointment of an equity committee. 150 Disregarding economic efficiency arguments
entirely and focusing instead on procedural fairness, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio went so far as to note that the debtor's insolvency was altogether
"irrelevant" to the analysis.1 51 Even the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
142. See generally supra note 101 and sources cited therein (giving examples of shareholders' motions).
143. See infra notes 147 through 152 and accompanying text (listing cases that apply the more lenient legal
standard).
144. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 5796 (1978).
145. Id.
146. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5790.
147. The language was initially used in In re Emons Indus., Inc., 50 B.R. 692, 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
148. In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc., 96 B.R. 779, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
149. In re Wang Labs., Inc., 149 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 1992).
150. See In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, 96 B.R. at 781 (stating that the court will not look exclusively to
the debtor's solvency); In re Emons Indus., 50 B.R. at 694 (explaining that equity security holders could have a
different view on the issue of insolvency).
151. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 27 B.R. 554, 558 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
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of New York acknowledged in a 1987 ruling that "costs alone cannot and should not
deprive public debt and security holders of representation."1 52
Professors LoPucki and Whitford's preemptive cram down proposal' 53 fits nicely
under a generous standard of this sort; by foreclosing the rights of interest holders in cases
of clear insolvency, it serves as a check on a system that otherwise facilitates shareholder
participation. At the time the authors issued their recommendation, bankruptcy process was
much more inclusive of shareholders. In fact, by the mid-1990s, it had become much more
common to see official equity committees in Chapter 11 cases involving large, publicly
traded companies. 154 The trend picked up more steam in the early 2000s, leading several
industry commentators to remark that the "appointment of a formal equity committee
appears to have recently taken the US [sic] bankruptcy world by storm."1 55 However,
unbeknownst to these commentators at the time they made this remark, a jurisprudential
shift had already begun to erode the legal foundation for the appointment of official equity
committees in most cases.
As bankruptcy's common law evolved, the legal standard for the appointment of an
official equity committee has become much less flexible to shareholder needs, and a new,
largely unsupported alternative rule has taken root in the jurisdictions most likely to hear
large commercial bankruptcies.1 56 As in Eastman Kodak, courts applying the newer
standard emphasize economic efficiency over procedural fairness, placing a high burden
of proof on shareholders who seek the appointment of an official committee. 157 Under this
approach, shareholders must demonstrate that there is a substantial likelihood that
shareholders will receive a meaningful distribution in the Chapter 11 case under a strict
application of the absolute priority rule. 158 In other words, it is not enough for shareholders
to argue that the debtor is not hopelessly insolvent; rather, those requesting an official
equity committee must show that there is in fact sufficient residual value to provide a
distribution to equity security holders, even after all other claims and expenses are paid. 159
The standard effectively requires the court to ensure that shareholders, not creditors, will
bear the economic burdens of forming an official equity committee. 160 This new standard
152. In re Mclean Indus., 70 B.R. 852, 860 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
153. See supra notes 114-120 (describing the authors' proposal).
154. See Thomas Henry Coleman & David E. Woodruff, Looking Out for Shareholders: The Role of the
Equity Committee in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 68 Am. BANKR. L.J.
295, 295-96 (1994) (examining the then emergent trend of official equity committees in large commercial
bankruptcies).
155. Bob Rajan & Brett Harrison, The New Wave of Equity Committees in Bankruptcy: What Are They and
Are They Here to Stay?, 10 INT'L CORP. REsCUE 1, 1 (2006).
156. See infra notes 158-167 and accompanying text (including examples of cases in jurisdictions applying
the referred alternative rule).
157. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining how the alternative standard requires
shareholders to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a meaningful distribution before allowing the formation
of an official equity committee).
158. In re Williams Commc'ns Grp, Inc., 281 B.R. 216,220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
159. In re Nat'l R.V. Holdings, Inc., 390 B.R. 690, 696 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (taking administrative costs
explicitly into consideration).
160. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining how the Williams standard requires shareholders
to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a meaningful distribution before allowing the formation of an official
equity committee). The costs of official committees "are paid by the debtor corporation, effectively passing these
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arguably arose out of dictal 61 in In re Williams Communications Group, Inc., a 2002
opinion from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. 162 After
devoting much of its analysis to the "hopelessly insolvent" standard and even reiterating
that the U.S. Trustee and the court need not make an actual valuation finding,163 the
Williams court summarized its holding by noting that "an equity committee should not be
appointed unless equity holders can establish ... a 'substantial likelihood' of a 'meaningful
distribution."' 1 64 This language has been adopted by the U.S. Trustee and by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts for the Southern District of New York and the District of Delaware, 165
which are the two most common venues for large corporate filings under Chapter 11.166
For instance, in Eastman Kodak, the U.S. Trustee and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York relied upon Williams to twice deny shareholders' requests
to appoint an official equity committee. 167
As noted above, the Williams decision effectively shifts the burden of proof, doing
significant violence to the ability of shareholders to participate in Chapter 11 plan
negotiations.16 8 It not only presumptively excludes shareholders, but also essentially
effectuates Professors LoPucki and Whitford's preemptive cram down, in substance if not
in form. 169 Of course, shareholders remain parties to the case and can attempt to raise
arguments on their own. But by making it so difficult for shareholders to organize and
obtain formal representation in the case, the decision forecloses meaningful shareholder
participation and makes it highly unlikely that they will be able to successfully advance
costs on to some or all of the persons who will share in distributions under the reorganization plan." LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 53, at 680. In this way, the Williams standard attempts to be responsive to the cost concerns
cited supra note 109.
161. Heather Lennox et al., Best Practices Report: Formation, Function, and Obligations of Equity
Committees in Chapter 11, 2013 ANN. SURV. BANKR. LAw 5, 9 (2013) ("The Williams court's 'substantial
likelihood' standard was sui generis (the court cited to no authority in support of its announced standard) and
perhaps even dicta (although the court proposed this standard, it arguably did not apply it).").
162. In re Williams, 281 B.R. at 220.
163. Id. at 221.
164. Id. at 223.
165. The "substantial likelihood of a meaningful distribution" standard was applied by bankruptcy courts in
the following cases, among others: In re Spansion, Inc., 421 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); In re Oneida
Ltd., 56 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 261, 2006 WL 1288576, at *1, *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Nw. Corp.,
2004 WL 1077913, at *1, *2 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
166. This strong jurisdictional preference is recently noted in Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of
Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 2, 9 (2014). Forum-shopping in large commercial bankruptcy cases was also the
subject of empirical analysis in Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11, 12 (1991) (finding
evidence of forum shopping in a substantial number of observed cases, with New York City as the most commonly
selected venue).
167. In re Eastman Kodak Co., 2012 WL2501071, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Eastman Kodak Co.,
2013 WL 4413300, at *1, *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
168. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (describing the standard that must be met for an official
equity committee to be appointed).
169. See supra notes 114-120 (describing the authors' proposal).
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arguments or negotiate to receive a distribution. 170 And it does so across the board, without
any of the safeguards or limitations that the authors recommended.1 7 1
The decision and its progeny rely upon relatively thin economic analyses of corporate
and bankruptcy law, whereby large commercial debtors are assumed to be rational, unitary
actors that are capable of deliberate action to maximize their economic utility. 172 Such
actors would not submit to an expensive and time consuming Chapter 11 case unless they
were so hopelessly insolvent that they would be unable to continue as a going concern
without the special protections bankruptcy affords. In this way, the decision privileges
economic efficiency goals over procedural fairness, creating a deep disparity in access to
the negotiation table and thereby virtually ensuring relatively early in the case that
shareholders will not receive a distribution.
Indeed, the untested economic theories underlying these assumptions, and their ability
to blind courts to the economic realities of a given case, are fully evidenced in Williams.
There, the court cited, as evidence of the debtor's hopeless insolvency, the fact that over
one-third of the company's unsecured creditors agreed to settle billions of dollars in claims
in exchange for equity in the reorganized debtor. 173 The court explained, "[t]his is a telling
agreement since the opportunity for unsecured creditors to receive cash or restructured
debt, for even a portion of their claim, [as opposed to 'the highly uncertain value of
common stock'] would almost certainly have been seized." 174 It seems the court viewed
the debtor as a rational, unitary actor, capable of taking deliberate steps to maximize its
own economic utility, such that it would only pursue Chapter 11 reorganization if it were
driven by its hopeless insolvency. The court failed to consider other possible explanations:
that the debtor may have been captured by dominant creditors, that the reorganized debtor's
equity interests might simply have been worth more than the debtors' financial disclosures
suggested, and that creditors were comfortable assuming risks associated with equity
investments in order to enjoy the full upside potential. At the same time, even after
acknowledging that the creditors intended to advance to the equity position, the court
expressed confidence that the official creditors' committee would adequately represent the
company's historic shareholders. 17 5 Evidencing a policy preference that is contrary to
precedent and congressional intent, the Williams court concluded with a stern proclamation
that "[t]he appointment of official equity committees should be the rare exception."l 76
Following Williams, the U.S. Trustee and the most influential bankruptcy courts
consistently echo this heightened standard. They construe the jurisprudence to require only
that the U.S. Trustee review the available financial data and determine whether there are
sufficient "indicator[s] of insolvency" to warrant refusal to appoint an official equity
170. See infra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining how Chapter 11 privileges organizational actors).
171. For instance, the authors propose a hearing in which the moving party presents evidence regarding the
debtor's valuation. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 113, at 636-43 (explaining the proposed mechanism and the
various safeguards and limitations).
172. This pervasive view is explored in Dick, supra note 14.
173. In re Williams Commc'ns Grp. Inc., 281 B.R. 216, 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 222.
176. Id. at 223.
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committee. 177 When applied in this manner, the Williams court's reminder that the judge
need not conduct a full valuation analysis at this stage merely ensures that the debtor's own
financial disclosures and valuations will be afforded great deference, without regard to the
inherent limitations of these data sources. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York decided that courts may assign "presumptive validity" to
determinations made under GAAP,17 8 thereby rendering it even more difficult for
shareholders (or any other parties) to challenge the debtors' claims. Meanwhile, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has repeatedly stated that
additional committees, including official equity committees, should not be appointed
unless those requesting such committees meet their burden of proof. 179 In practice,
therefore, for shareholders to persist in their demand for an official committee, they must
put forth a full valuation case of their own, without any guarantee that the expenses will be
borne by the bankruptcy estate, or that the court will even be receptive to their arguments.
Thus, the modem jurisprudence establishes a substantial barrier to entry for
shareholders of corporate debtors in Chapter 11 who wish to gain a seat at the negotiation
table, amounting to the functional equivalent of a preemptive cram down of equity owners.
Moreover, for shareholders who endeavor to prove the debtor's solvency, the analysis is
frustratingly circular. For instance, when Eastman Kodak Company's shareholders made
their first attempt to obtain an official equity committee, the court declined to consider the
shareholders' evidence of the debtors' solvency. It noted that "[a]ny potential benefit to
conducting [a valuation trial] is outweighed by the considerable time and expense it would
impose on Kodak at this stage of its reorganization." 1 80 But ironically, a valuation case is
necessary for shareholders to even attempt to demonstrate that there is a substantial
likelihood of a meaningful distribution to equity holders.
Furthermore, even where a court is receptive to shareholders' arguments concerning
valuation, there are obvious information asymmetries 1 8 1 and transaction costs1 82 that make
it difficult for shareholders to present a compelling case. 183 What is more, a successful
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., In re Centennial Textiles, Inc., 220 B.R. 165, 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that "the
court is inclined to assign presumptive validity to the treatment of assets and liabilities according to GAAP").
179. Id.; see also In re Residential Capital, LLC, 480 B.R. 550, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that the
moving parties did not meet their burden so the case is not appropriate for the appointment of a separate
committee).
180. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202, 2012 WL 2501071, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2012).
181. The problem of information asymmetries, which arise when one party to a transaction has more or better
information than the other(s), is explored in Joseph E. Stiglitz, Nobel Prize Lecture: Information and the Change
in the Paradigm in Economics (Dec. 8, 2001), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/economics/laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf (detailing Stiglitz's
contributions to the field). See generally Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies
with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. ECON. 229 (1986) (considering the role of the
government in addressing market inefficiencies caused by information asymmetries); George A. Akerloff, The
Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON 488 (1970) (exploring the
effect of information asymmetries in the used car market).
182. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach,
87 AMER. J. Soc. 548 (1981) (describing the potential economic distortions caused by transaction costs generally).
183. Moreover, the Williams standard incorporates the absolute priority rule, which is typically applied in a
way that fails to capture all potential sources of economic wealth in the debtor's estate. For instance, as I've
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attempt to obtain an official equity committee essentially requires shareholders of large,
publicly traded corporations to overcome their collective action obstacles outside of the
traditional legal structures, such as through deliberate, grassroots organization. In Eastman
Kodak, these challenges were especially pronounced. In their second attempt to obtain an
official equity committee, shareholders realized that they would need to present a full
valuation case, or at least cast sufficient doubt upon the valuation data provided by the
debtor and its management.184 They strategized for months, largely on public Internet
message boards. 185 In dozens of letters to the court and to the U.S. Trustee they argued,
among other things, that the debtor's plan-related financial disclosures were flawed in that
they assigned zero value to the company's extensive real property, foreign subsidiaries and
intellectual property holdings. 186 Similarly, they claimed that the debtor failed to disclose
substantial anticipated revenues from intellectual property transactions, 187 and declined to
adequately report the expected revenue from prospective joint ventures or the net present
value of the potential future benefits associated with the company's multibillion dollar net
operating losses. 188 Shareholders compiled and submitted extensive research to support
these assertions, including reports prepared by two expert witnesses. 189
The company's management not only objected to the shareholders' motion, 190 but
also filed Daubertl9 1 motions in limine to exclude most of the documentary evidence and
argued elsewhere, the standard declines to take into consideration the full value potential of certain intangible
assets-such as the debtor's tax attributes-because these assets would not be distributed to claimants in a
liquidation. Dick, supra note 28, at 2273.
184. See infra notes 186-89.
185. See, e.g., bustedl964, Balance Sheet March 31, 2013, KODAK BOARD (May 5, 2013, 7:47 AM),
http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5208/balance-sheet-march-31-2013 (reflecting upon the company's publicly
disclosed financial data); bk25, Valuation of Kodak/Uni-Pixel Partnership by Kodak Shareholders, KODAK
BOARD (May 3, 2013, 4:01 AM), http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5165/kodak-unipixel-partnership-valuation
(analyzing publicly disclosed financial data to determine the valuation of a joint venture project); dmdmd1,
IMO...My Cram Up Plan and DCF Analysis, KODAK BOARD (Apr. 8, 2013, 6:10 AM),
http://kodak.boards.net/thread/4544/imo-cram-plan-dcf-analysis (considering an alternative plan of
reorganization for the company).
186. See, e.g., Letter from Luis Diaz to U.S. Trustee re: Valuation of Kodak's Patent Portfolio, In re Eastman
Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2013), ECF No. 3911 (arguing that the debtor's
financial disclosures hugely underrated the value of the property); Letter from Sheila R. Paganini to U.S. Trustee
re: Valuation of Kodak's Patent Portfolio, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
June 5, 2013), ECF No. 3908 (stating that the debtor understated the value of Kodak's patents).
187. See Letter from William S. Crumley to Judge Gropper re: Patents/Revenue Filed, In re Eastman Kodak
Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013), ECF No. 4248 (demanding that the debtors
disclose the anticipated value of royalty stream licenses and licenses of patent assets); Letter from William S.
Crumley to Judge Gropper re: Sale of DC/KISS Patent Portfolio, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), ECF No. 4198 (demanding disclosure of information regarding royalty
stream licenses possibly retained by the debtor after sale of assets).
188. See, e.g., Letter from Matthew Glassman to Judge Gropper re: S'holder Representation, In re Eastman
Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013), ECF No. 3677 (sharing data showing
Kodak's potential future benefits from their multibillion dollar net operating losses).
189. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202,2013 WL 4413300, at *1-2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013).
190. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (giving an example of shareholders' attempts to obtain an
official equity committee and the debtor's objection thereto).
191. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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all of the expert testimony. 19 2 At the hearing to consider the shareholders' motion,
shareholders faced overwhelming opposition. In the words of one shareholder: "there were
19 lawyers sitting opposite us three stockholders and our attorney." 193
In its opinion declining, once and for all, to appoint an official equity committee and
granting the debtor's motions to exclude the shareholders' evidence, the court showed
some frustration towards shareholders engaged in direct action and grassroots
organization. 194 Instead of acknowledging that they had overcome considerable obstacles
and recognizing that they were not receiving reimbursement of costs from the estate, the
court roundly criticized them for not putting forth a more thorough valuation case. 195 The
court was unreceptive to the shareholders' experts, referring to them as "witnesses
purported to be experts" and repeatedly comparing them to the debtor's more prominent
professional advisors who were securely reimbursed from the bankruptcy estate. 196 Indeed,
the court ultimately excluded all of the shareholders' expert witness testimony as wholly
unreliable. 197 Finally, the court subjected the shareholders' arguments to extreme
reductionism, essentially characterizing them as disgruntled conspiracy theorists: "Other
than the unsupported hypothesis that Kodak, Kodak's professional advisors, the Creditors'
Committee, and the Committee's professional advisors are all not to be trusted, the
Shareholders provided no reason whatsoever for disregarding Kodak's publicly filed
financial statements and projections." 198 And with that, the shareholders' quest for a seat
at the bankruptcy negotiation table ended.
192. See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Debtors' Motion in Limine to Exclude all Opinion Testimony of Elise
Neils at the Hearing on the S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity
Comm., In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013), ECF No. 4546.
193. Interview with Nancy Bo (Dec. 28, 2013) (on file with the author).
194. The court made numerous references to the fact that the shareholders were unrepresented by counsel.
For instance, the court noted that "different shareholders ... acting pro se, began to file letters with the Court
complaining that they would receive nothing in Kodak's reorganization case . . . . None of the letters was
submitted through a lawyer." In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202,2013 WL 4413300, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2013). Later, the court referred to a pro se filing, as a "letter purport[ing] to be a motion." Id. at *2.
195. Id. at *4-6.
196. Id. at *2, *4-6. The court introduced the shareholders' experts solely by their names, excluding their
professional titles and affiliations. Id. at *2. ("Maulin V. Shah and Elise Neils"). In contrast, the court referred to
the debtor's advisors by their names, titles and professional affiliations. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202,
2013 WL 4413300, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013) ("David S. Kurtz, Vice Chairman and Global Head of
the Restructuring Group at Lazard Freres & Co., LLC"). Towards the end of the opinion, the court drew a starker
contrast, comparing the work of Elise Neils to that of "recognized professionals." Id. at *6. The court discounted
both the experience and professional opinions of Maulin V. Shah, Founder and Managing Director of Envision
IP, referring to him as "a law graduate who had practiced for a year" before founding an intellectual property
valuation firm, and referring to his uncontested points as "appear[ing] to be rooted in reality," and his contested
points as "fallacious logic." Id. at *4-5. In the case of Elise Neils, Managing Director of Brand Finance, the court
pointed out that "she or her colleagues spent a grand total of six hours before producing for the Shareholders a
'Kodak@ Preliminary Brand Valuation' at 3:00 a.m. on July 26, 2013." Id. at *5. Finally, the court blasted the
latter expert's testimony: "Even if Ms. Neils had had the opportunity in her six hours of work to learn the basic
facts regarding Kodak's present financial situation-and she admitted at the hearing that she did not-she did not
dispute that brand value is not a separate item of value." Id. at *6.
197. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202, 2013 WL 4413300, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013).
198. Id. at *5.
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Where shareholders are denied the appointment of an official equity committee, the
U.S. Trustee and/or the bankruptcy court essentially conclude one of two things: that
shareholders simply do not have any meaningful interests in the restructuring, 199 or that
their interests are adequately represented by the debtor's management and/or by the official
creditors' committee. 200 Indeed, the bankruptcy court in Eastman Kodak provided both
justifications. 20 1 The latter point assumes that, to the extent creditors have become residual
claimants, they arguably possess the same economic preferences as equity security holders
and can be expected to advance restructuring outcomes that benefit both classes. 202 But in
practice, neither the debtor's management nor an official creditors' committee may be
capable of providing shareholders with adequate representation. As shareholders argued in
Eastman Kodak, the debtor's management frequently takes an adversarial stance towards
shareholders in Chapter 11 cases, particularly to the extent shareholders are viewed as an
obstacle to reaching a negotiated settlement with creditors.20 3 Official creditors'
committees are not under any affirmative obligation to represent equity security holders,
even if the court believes that they are somehow inclined to do so. In Eastman Kodak, the
debtor's attorneys from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP made this amply clear in letters
delivered to individual common shareholders: "[T]he Official Committee [of Unsecured
Creditors] represents prepetition unsecured creditors (not Kodak Equity Interests)." 204
Practically speaking, the creditors' committee has no real incentive to push for a higher
valuation of the debtor, such that equity holders might receive a distribution; this is
especially true where the Chapter 11 plan contemplates that creditors will advance to an
equity position in the reorganized company. 205
More broadly, most official committees are comprised of the largest interest
holders, 206 who may not be responsive to the needs of widely dispersed, non-insider20 7
199. This point is cogently made in In re Ampex Corp., No. 08-11094, 2008 WL 2051128, at *2 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2008) ("Given that none of the creditors senior to equity are receiving payment in full on behalf
of their claims, there simply is no value for equity holders and thus they have no meaningful interest in the
outcome of the case.").
200. Such is the conclusion of the Williams court: "the Creditors' Committee has sufficiently aligned or
parallel interests with the Shareholders to preclude the need for an additional committee." In re Williams
Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 281 B.R. 216, 222-23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
201. Kodak, 2013 WL4413300, at *2-3.
202. Williams, 281 B.R. at 222-23.
203. See Kodak S'holders' Joint Motion for Order, supra note 84 (asking the court to appoint an official
committee of equity security holders); Letter to Judge, supra note 84 (asking the court to appoint an official
committee of equity security holders).
204. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew G. Dietderich, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Joseph Dallal,
Kodak Shareholder (Jul. 12, 2013) (on file with author).
205. See In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 407 B.R. 211, 218-19 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (acknowledging
conflicts of this sort).
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012) (requiring that the U.S. trustee ordinarily appoint the persons holding the
seven largest claims against the debtor to the creditors' committee).
207. Insiders have other strategic advantages that enable them to negotiate for better treatment in Chapter
11. Consider the following example documented in a 1990 empirical study: "In the Dreco Energy case, insiders,
who constituted management at filing, controlled 75% of the shares. They were able to secure a very favorable
distribution to equity in part because their continued participation in the company was considered critical to its
success." LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 79, at 143. The phenomenon is further explored in Jerome R. Kerkman,
The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159, 165-83 (1987);
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individual investors with relatively small interests. Finally, prominent institutional
investors at times engage in committee capture, steering the agenda towards promotion of
their own, often conflicted, interests. 208 Indeed, even official equity committees are
susceptible to the same problems. In light of these realities, the following Subpart considers
whether the debtor's common shareholders might rely upon ad hoc groups 20 9 -or even
dominant shareholders who participate directly in the case-to advance their interests.
C. Ad Hoc Groups; Direct Action by Large Shareholders
As the previous Subparts argue, other traditional legal structures largely fail to
promote the interests of a bankrupt company's widely dispersed common shareholders.
Without a seat at the negotiation table, equity owners are highly unlikely to successfully
advance arguments or bargain to receive a distribution; in essence, they are preemptively
crammed down. Sidestepping concerns of this sort, the Williams court noted that "in most
cases, even those equity holders who do expect a distribution in the case can adequately
represent their interest without an official committee." 210 To be fair, all equity security
holders of the debtor are "parties in interest" under Chapter 11, and thus have the right to
appear and be heard on issues pertaining to the restructuring; 2 11 in this way, they are not
actually preemptively crammed down. But as the legislative history of Chapter 11
reveals, 2 12 and as I have argued elsewhere, 2 13 modem commercial bankruptcy process
privileges organizational actors, such as official committees, who have a seat at the
negotiation table. Because Chapter 11 relies upon party consensus and market mechanisms
to reach restructuring outcomes, parties cannot simply trust the judicial process to protect
their interests. 2 14 Without a ready seat at the negotiation table, meaningful participation
effectively requires financial backing, as only official committees are assured
reimbursement of costs and expenses from the debtor's estate.2 15 For these reasons, the
ability to organize through official committees confers a distinct structural privilege,
affording certain parties the right to participate meaningfully in plan negotiations.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57
AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 247, 272-73 (1983).
208. See generally Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REv. 749 (2011) (empirically
investigating these and related concerns).
209. See generally David L. Perechocky, Should Ad Hoc Committees Have Fiduciary Duties?: Judicial
Regulation ofthe Bankruptcy Market, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 527 (2012) (giving scholarly attention to ad hoc groups,
and proposing a number of theories that could justify imposing fiduciary duties on ad hoc groups, but concluding
that nonetheless courts should not impose such duties for practical and normative reasons).
210. In re Williams Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 281 B.R. 216, 223 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
211. See supra note 4 (defining a "party in interest" in a Chapter 11 proceeding).
212. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
213. See generally Dick, supra note 14 (challenging the idea that the use of market mechanisms will make
bankruptcy proceedings more efficient).
214. Id
215. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).
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Nonetheless, persons holding equity positions may come together and form ad hoc
committees in Chapter 11 cases. 2 16 These groups at times muscle their way to the
negotiation table. Historically, these informal groupings were comprised of large,
institutional shareholders with the financial means to intervene in bankruptcy
proceedings. 2 17 For instance, an ad hoc group mainly consisting of hedge funds intervened
in the bankruptcy reorganization of Spansion, Inc., to object to the debtors' Chapter 11 plan
and disclosure statements. 2 18 Recognizing the historical tendency for ad hoc committees
to consist of persons with market power in the securities and capital markets, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York noted that such committees
"implicitly ask the court and other parties to give their positions a degree of credibility
appropriate to a unified group with large holdings." 2 19
In recent years, however, individual common shareholders with much smaller
holdings have attempted to participate in bankruptcy cases through informal groupings of
this sort. For instance, in the 2009 bankruptcy reorganization of Source Interlink Co., Inc.,
a group of individual common shareholders formed an ad hoc committee and retained
counsel to pursue the appointment of an official equity committee. 220 In the Chapter 11
bankruptcy of Washington Mutual, Inc., 22 1 a group of individual common shareholders
formed a limited liability company to receive donations to cover the group's costs and
expenses and to attempt to intervene in the proceedings. 222 Most recently, a group of
Eastman Kodak Company's individual common shareholders formed an ad hoc committee
and retained counsel in their final push to obtain an official equity committee and, when
such requests failed, to object to the debtor's proposed Chapter 11 plan.223
Even where the group is not comprised of persons with sizable individual or combined
holdings, ad hoc committees nonetheless allow similarly situated parties to coordinate
activities and share expenses in their attempts to influence the proceedings. As the U.S.
216. See, e.g., infra notes 218 and 219 and accompanying text (explaining the nature and role of ad hoc
committees).
217. See infra note 219 and accompanying text (implying that ad hoc committees were traditionally
comprised of large and powerful stakeholders).
218. See In re Spansion, Inc., 426 BR. 114, 118 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (evidencing a number of filings made
by the "Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security Holders").
219. In re Northwest Airlines, 363 BR. 701, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
220. Letter from David N. Ravin, Robert E. Nies & Christopher A. Ward, Co-Counsel for the Ad Hoc
Committee of Equity Shareholders re: Request to Appoint an Official Committee of Equity Security Holders, In
re Source Interlink Co., Inc., et al., No. 09-11424 (Bankr. D. Del. May 8, 2009), ECF No. 113.
221. In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del.). The parent company and its
affiliates filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Delaware. The cases were jointly administered as Case No. 08-12229 (MFW) under the
caption "In re Washington Mutual, Inc."
222. United Intemational Equity Members' Objection to the Global Settlement Agreement, In re Washington
Mutual, Inc., Case No. 08-12229 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 11, 2011), ECF No. 6925; Interview with Catherine
Dziok (Aug. 21, 2013) (on file with the author).
223. See, e.g., Shareholders' Objection to Debtors' First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization
Filed by Ahsan Zia, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013), ECF
No. 4658; Request for Service of Papers by Wayne M. Greenwald on Behalf of Ahsan Zia as Representative of
the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security Holders, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013), ECF No. 4542.
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware acknowledged: "[C]ollective action . . .
through the use of ad hoc committees or groups allows [claimants] to utilize other group
members' holdings to obtain a greater degree of influence in a bankruptcy case than single
[claimants] acting alone." 2 24 But when it comes to advancing the interests of widely
dispersed common shareholders, these arrangements are a weak substitute for formal
representation, such as through the appointment of an official committee. For one thing, it
is much more difficult for ad hoc committees to receive reimbursement of expenses from
the debtor's estate. 225 Attorneys and other professionals retained by an ad hoc committee
are only paid by the debtor's estate if they can demonstrate that the committee made a
substantial contribution to the bankruptcy case. 226 Courts typically apply the test strictly,
making these motions difficult to sustain.227 Also, ad hoc committees are not a panacea
because, while the law is unsettled with respect to the potential fiduciary duties of informal
groupings to those they purport to represent, 22 8 there is presently no affirmative obligation
for ad hoc equity committee members to negotiate on behalf of all shareholders. 229
Alternatively, individual common shareholders might choose to rely on other, larger
shareholders with market power in the capital and securities markets who engage directly
in the Chapter 11 case on their own as parties in interest. 230 For example, in Delphi
Corporation's 2005 bankruptcy reorganization, a hedge fund that held a substantial stake
in the debtor's equity directly intervened in the case, retaining in the process one of the
world's largest commercial law firms. 23 1 These actions presumably had the potential to
benefit all equity security holders, including persons with much smaller stakes. But
although hedge funds and other large, activist investors regularly engage in direct action in
bankruptcy cases, 232 their participation is not a substitute for formal representation of
widely dispersed common shareholders. For one thing, these large shareholders have their
own interests, which might be influenced by their broader portfolios and investment goals.
Moreover, they may be incentivized to seek excess returns, the costs of which the debtor's
other common shareholders would ultimately bear. For instance, large shareholders might
use their leverage to negotiate for benefits other than a distribution on account of their
224. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 419 B.R. 271, 279 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (applying the "substantial
contribution" standard to a Chapter 11 proceeding). A recent case declining to award professional fees to attorneys
representing an ad hoc equity committee demonstrates the difficulty of meeting the "substantial contribution"
standard. In re Spansion Inc., 2014 WL 1928632 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
228. This question was recently raised in the Northwest Airlines and Washington Mutual bankruptcy cases.
See Perechocky, supra note 209, at 532-33 (describing how the Northwest Airlines and Washington Mutual courts
raised the possibility of fiduciary duties for ad hoc committees).
229. See id. (arguing that ad hoc committees do not and should not have fiduciary duties).
230. Hedge fund activism in corporate governance matters is explored in Seretakis, supra note 32. In a
balanced and thoughtful critique, the author considers the risks and advantages of hedge fund interventions.
231. See Response of the U.S. Trustee to Motion of Appaloosa Mgmt. L.P., In re Delphi Corp. et al., Case
No. 05 B 44481 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2005), ECF No. 1682.
232. The nature and consequences of these activities are explored in Jongha Lim, The Role ofActivist Hedge
Funds in Distressed Firms (2010) (Working Paper, 2010) (on file with Ohio State University), available at
http://business.uc.edu/content/dam/business/departments/finance/docs/Jongha%2OLimJobMarketPaper_11191
0.pdf.
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equity security interests, such as participation in a pre- or post-plan confirmation credit
facility bearing above-market fees and interest. These dangers are particularly acute
because there is no affirmative legal obligation for shareholders who engage in direct action
to negotiate on behalf of all shareholders, and shareholders generally do not owe fiduciary
duties to other shareholders. 233
Perhaps in light of these realities, Eastman Kodak Company's individual common
shareholders chose not to rely solely upon ad hoc committees or the direct action of other,
larger shareholders. Instead, they also sought representation from those who have taken an
oath of office to serve and protect the public: the U.S. Trustee, the bankruptcy judge and
other court officials, and employees of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The following Subpart considers these possible avenues for protection and advancement
of shareholder interests in large commercial bankruptcies.
D. The Office of the U.S. Trustee, the Bankruptcy Court and the SEC
When all else fails, individual common shareholders of bankrupt companies may look
to the U.S. Trustee to protect their interests. For instance, in Eastman Kodak, even after the
U.S. Trustee denied the first request to appoint an official equity committee, individual
shareholders posting on a message board created by and for common equity holders
devised a plan to "write letters to [the U.S. Trustee for the region that includes the Southern
District of New York] requesting her to support [their second attempt to obtain an official
equity committee]." 234 At another point in the case, shareholders encouraged each other to
reach out to the U.S. Trustee to report "insider trading and fraud allegation[s]." 235 Such
reliance is fitting, as the primary role of the U.S. Trustee Program is to serve as the
"watchdog" over the bankruptcy process, with the specific authority to monitor Chapter 11
plans and disclosure statements. 236 The U.S. Trustee is also designated to receive
233. See Global Crossing Estate Representative v. Winnick, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53785, at *66-67 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 2006) ("[A] fiduciary duty exists only in those rare cases where a shareholder 'dominate[s] and control[s]
a corporation,' and thus may be held liable 'for detriment to the corporation caused by their breach of the fiduciary
obligation arising from that relationship."').
234. Subzeroooo, Letter to US Trustee Requesting Support for EC, KODAK BOARD (Jul. 21, 2013, 6:52 PM),
http://www.kodak.boards.net/thread/6191/letter-trustee-requesting-support-ec.
235. Godzilla, U.S. Trustee Hope Davis in Big Trouble, KODAK BOARD (May 22, 2013, 6:25 PM),
http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5592/trustee-hope-davis-big-trouble. Responding to the original post, the same
commenter posted, in all capital letters: "WE ALL NEED TO EMAIL HER."
236. S. REP. 95-595 at 5966 (1978); see also In re South Beach Sec., Inc., 606 F.3d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 2010)
(discussing the duties assigned to the Trustee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(B) (authorizing
the U.S. Trustee to monitor Chapter 11 plans and disclosure statements); Morgenstern v. Revco D.S., Inc., 898
F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1990) (referring to the U.S. Trustee as a "watchdog"). The program was initially
introduced through a pilot program in 1978, and subsequently expanded in 1986. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM,
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public-affairs/factsheet/docs/fs02.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) (describing the
U.S. Trustee Program).
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complaints of criminal violations-such as fraud-in the bankruptcy system,237 and the
agency has recently launched independent initiatives to target bankruptcy abuse. 238
However, as the program's mission statement foreshadows, shareholders of corporate
debtors once again largely fall through the cracks: "The mission of the United States
Trustee Program is to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the
benefit of all stakeholders-debtors, creditors, and the public."239 The term "equity
holders" is conspicuously missing from the list of intended beneficiaries. Of course, the
list of stakeholders was not necessarily intended to be exclusive. 240 Moreover, common
shareholders of publicly traded corporations are also members of "the public," and thus fall
within the broadest of the three named categories of beneficiaries.
But in practice, shareholders of large corporate debtors have had little success in
appealing to the U.S. Trustee for assistance. As noted above, the U.S. Trustee has grown
less hospitable to shareholder requests for a seat at the bankruptcy negotiation table, at
times filing oppositions to requests that the court order the appointment of an official equity
committee. These phenomena were fully evidenced in Eastman Kodak.24 1 Furthermore, at
least one Eastman Kodak Company shareholder experienced some difficulties in
contacting the designated U.S. Trustee: "The trustee never answered my letter. She gave
the wrong fax number out. At one point they moved offices and my registered letter got
returned and said no one [was] there at that address." 242 In general, the U.S. Trustee tends
not to intervene in large corporate bankruptcies in ways that upset the expectations of
dominant stakeholders. 243
Similarly, as another last possible vestige, shareholders of bankrupt companies may
plead directly with the judge to protect their interests. In Eastman Kodak, individual
237. See REPORTING BANKRUPTCY FRAUD, http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/%5Bfield_sitemenu-category-
raw/o5D/reporting-bankruptcy-fraud (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) (describing the process to file bankruptcy fraud
complaints to the U.S. Trustee).
238. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Executive Office for U.S. Trustee, U.S. Trustee Program
Launches Bankruptcy Civil Enforcement Initiative (Oct. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public-affairs/press/docs/pr20011030.htm (outlining U.S. Trustee Civil
Enforcement Initiative).
239. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN & MISSION, http://www.justice.gov/ustleo/ust-org/mission.htm
(last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
240. However, if we reason by analogy and apply canons of statutory interpretation to the mission statement,
then the omission is potentially more troublesome. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank,
N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2000) (noting that where "a statute ... names the parties granted [the] right to invoke its
provisions, . . . such parties only may act") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); U.S. v. Landmesser,
378 F.3d 308, 313 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that explicit
mention of one thing in a statute implies a congressional intent to exclude similar things that were not specifically
mentioned.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
241. See supra Part 11.2 (describing the U.S. Trustee's opposition to shareholder requests inEastrnan Kodak).
242. Interview with Nancy Bo (Jan. 2,2014) (on file with the author).
243. This may reflect the realities of a governmental agency that interacts with a relatively small and insular
insolvency and restructuring community. Indeed, in a recent incident, a bankruptcy judge on the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York publicly admonished and compared a U.S. Trustee to a "first-year
law student" for her actions in a trial arising out of the U.S. Trustee's accusations of conflicts of interests and
unreasonable professional fees. See Jacqueline Palank, Bankruptcy Watchdog Defends Role in GSC Case, WALL
ST. J. (May 13, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com//bankruptcy/2013/05/13/bankruptcy-watchdog-defends-role-in-gsc-
case/ (describing how the U.S. Trustee defended her role in the trial).
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shareholders sent dozens of heartfelt letters to the judge, with many taking a relatively
informal tone and some even written by hand.24 4 One such letter closed with the statement:
"I hope you will remember us and look out for us. It appears nobody else is." 245 Another
shareholder penned the following: "again I write to you still believing that the United States
has the best legal system in the world. I'm confident that the Kodak common shareholders'
'Equity Interests' are carefully being watched over from your Courtroom." 24 6 Yet another
shareholder explained, "I do not understand the laws. I understand that I can ask that you
help to protect any rights I may have." 247
This strategy has the potential to be successful, as the Bankruptcy Code grants the
judge broad equitable powers. 24 8 The bankruptcy court can alter the course of bankruptcy
negotiations by, among other things, "monitoring, mediating, [and] setting deadlines." 24 9
But the court gave Eastman Kodak Company shareholders little relief. For instance, when
asked whether the court or any officers of the court attempted to represent the needs of
individual common shareholders during the bankruptcy, one shareholder responded: "No,
with the exception of some of the people in the clerk's office who went out of their way to
make sure we were heard (or at least our letters and objections put on the docket)." 250 As
the shareholders learned in their attempts to obtain an official equity committee,
bankruptcy judges cannot use these broad equitable powers to protect interests that the
law-as influenced by economic efficiency norms-presumes to be nonexistent. On one
hand, the experience in Eastman Kodak may simply reflect the tendency for courts to defer
to the sound business judgments of the debtor.2 51 But it might also reflect a deeper "pro-
debtor" behavioral bias across the bankruptcy bench.2 52 This preference, to the extent it
244. See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth Heinlein to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No.
12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 1, 2013), ECF No. 4233 (appealing to the judge directly in a hand-written
letter for assistance).
245. Id.
246. Letter from Joseph Dallal to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2013), ECF No. 4398.
247. Letter from Mark Bolivar to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 10, 2013), ECF No. 4266.
248. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2013) (giving a bankruptcy judge the broad authority to issue any
order, process or judgment necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code). See also
Brenham v. Deerfield Org., Inc. (Matter ofNorman Indus., Inc.), I BR. 162, 165 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1979) (opining
that the predecessor statute of § 105(a) recognized and declared the principle that courts of bankruptcy are courts
of equity).
249. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 53, at 716.
250. Interview with Greg Armstrong (Dec. 6, 2013) (on file with the author).
251. The business judgment rule has been applied to bankruptcy questions. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc.
v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (4h Cir. 1985) (finding that with respect to the
decision whether to assign or reject an executory contract, "the bankrupt's decision upon it is to be accorded the
deference mandated by the sound business judgment rule as generally applied by courts to discretionary actions
or decisions of corporate directors").
252. The phenomenon is noted in Keith Sharfinan, Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence From
Bankruptcy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 390 (2005); see also DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 194 (2001) (acknowledging a pro-debtor bias).
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exists, implicates a broader proclivity of bankruptcy judges to be viewed as facilitators of
successful reorganizations. 253
Finally, individual common shareholders at times attempt to contact officials at the
SEC, the federal agency responsible for protecting public investors and regulating and
enforcing compliance with the federal securities laws. The SEC is technically a statutory
party to all Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, and may act as a special advisor to the
courts with the power to "raise and ... appear and be heard on any issue." 254 In Eastman
Kodak, shareholders posting on an online message board devoted an entire sub-forum to
devising a strategy to obtain the assistance of the SEC. 2 55 A poster explained: "We need
to make the SEC aware of the fraud that is being perpetrated against the shareholders,"
encouraging other forum participants to post any contacts they may have at the SEC and to
engage in a letter writing campaign. 2 56 When another poster noted that he or she already
met with a person affiliated with the SEC, the original poster encouraged the shareholder
to "get him and his team copies of the [filings made by shareholders to] the docket,"
expressing hope that "they wont [sic] believe their eyes!" 257
The SEC has, at times, intervened in Chapter 11 cases on behalf of a debtor company's
public investors. Indeed, as Professor Douglas Baird explained, the SEC's advocacy in a
pivotal 1930s commercial bankruptcy case had the "consequence of firmly embedding the
absolute priority rule in the law of corporate reorganizations." 2 58 More recently, the SEC
filed a 35-page memorandum in support of an ad hoc committee's motion for the
appointment of an official equity committee in the 2004 Interstate Bakeries Corporation
Chapter 11 case. 259 The motion outlined public company shareholders' unique
vulnerabilities, reminding the court that "no other entity can be expected to protect the
common interests of ... [common, non-insider] shareholders," 260 and arguing in favor of
the earlier, more flexible "hopelessly insolvent" standard for the appointment of an official
equity committee. 26 1 The SEC filed a similar memorandum of law in 2009 to support
253. Greg Zipes, Securitization: Challenges in the Age of LTV Steel Co., Inc., 2002 ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L.
105, 116 (2002).
254. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
255. See Contact SEC Regarding Kodak, KODAK-SHAREHOLDERS.COM,
http://kodak.boards.net/board/12/contact-sec-regarding-kodak (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (discussing methods
to contact the SEC).
256. Admin, Post any and all contacts for the SEC!!!, KODAK-SHAREHOLDERS.COM (May 11, 2013,
3:02 PM), http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5358/post-any-all-contacts-sec.
257. Admin, Post any and all contacts for the SEC!!!, KODAK-SHAREHOLDERS.COM (May 22, 2013,
5:26 PM), http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5358/post-any-all-contacts-sec.
258. Douglas G. Baird, Present at the Creation: The SEC and the Origins of the Absolute Priority Rule, 18
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 591, 605 (2010).
259. Memorandum of the U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n in Support of the Motion of Ad Hoc Committee for
Appointment of Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders, In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., Case No. 04-45814 (JMV)
(Bankr. W.D. Ms. Nov. 9, 2004), ECF No. 549.
260. Id. at 2. Further, the SEC reminded the court that an "official committee charged with safeguarding the
interests of the class it represents is one of the critical protections for creditors and shareholders provided in the
Bankruptcy Code." Id at 5.
261. Id.
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shareholders of Pilgrim's Pride Corporation. 262 And, in several recent, high-profile
corporate scandals, the SEC has intervened to reconfigure the firm's governance structure
during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. 263
But the SEC never intervened in Eastman Kodak. This is most likely because, in
modem practice, the agency does not typically take a substantive role in most bankruptcy
cases; in fact, the SEC's own website notes that "[i]n most bankruptcy cases, the role of
the SEC is limited." 264 As a general rule, the SEC's role is restricted to its more traditional
functions: monitoring disclosures, policing fraud, and ensuring that bankruptcy process is
not used to evade securities regulations 265 Evidencing this more customary role, the SEC
recently filed an opposition to a debtor company's Chapter 11 plan on the grounds that the
restructuring was a sham designed to allow a private company to go public without
complying with securities registration requirements. 266
To be sure, literature has greatly disagreed on the SEC's proper role in commercial
bankruptcy cases. In their influential 1990 study, Professors LoPucki and Whitford urged
the SEC to intervene in Chapter 11 cases to promote the interests of public equity
investors. 267 More recently, the debate took center stage at the American Bankruptcy
Institute Law Review's 2010 symposium, "The SEC in Bankruptcy: Past, Present and
Future." 268 Reflecting on recent SEC interventions in high profile corporate scandals,
Professor David Skeel argued that although such interventions may be appropriate in
262. Memorandum of the U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n in Support of the Motion of Ad Hoc Committee for
Appointment of Comm. of Equity Security Holders, In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., Case No. 08-45664 (DML)
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2009), ECF No. 1590. Following the SEC's intervention in both cases, official equity
committees were appointed.
263. These efforts are detailed in Alistaire Bambach & Samuel R. Maizel, The SEC's Role in Public
Company Bankruptcy Cases Where There Is a Significant Enforcement Interest, 2005 ANN. SuRV. BANKR. L. 99
(2006); David A. Skeel, Welcome Back, SEC?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 573, 585-86 (2010).
264. Bankruptcy, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bankrup.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). The SEC's public
statement echoes the conclusion of a 1977 study, which found that the SEC's role under the draft proposed
Chapter 11, "resembles that of an amicus curiae. Its function is advisory, rather than adjudicative." Michael E.
Hooton, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission Under Chapter X Chapter X7 and Proposed
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, 18 BOSTON COLL. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 427, 429 (1977). The history of
the SEC's role in commercial bankruptcies is thoughtfully laid out in David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of
the SEC in Bankruptcy (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 267, 1999), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract1 72030.
265. These are the so-called traditional functions of the SEC. Skeel, supra note 263, at 581-82. Yet even in
respect of these traditional functions, the SEC does not place any special emphasis on bankrupt companies. A
recent empirical study of securities class actions acknowledges "no statistically significant difference in the
percentage of... parallel SEC actions for bankruptcy cases." James J. Park, Securities Class Actions andBankrupt
Companies, 11l MICH. L. REv. 547, 569 (2013).
266. See Tiffany Kary, Edison Mission Bankruptcy Reorganization Opposed by SEC, BLOOMBERG.COM
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-ll/Edison-mission-bankruptcy-reorganization-
opposed-by-sec.html (explaining the SEC's opposition to Edison Mission Energy's bankruptcy reorganization
because it envisioned a scenario in which a "public shell, cleansed of liabilities, can be marketed to private
companies that want to go public through a reverse merger and avoid the usual registration requirements of
securities law").
267. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 79, at 193 ("We believe that the SEC has played a valuable role in the
cases in our study and that it should remain active in the reorganization of large, publicly held companies. The
Commission's most important function has probably been as a catalyst in the formation of equity committees.").
268. G. Ray Warner & Keith Sharfman, The SEC in Bankruptcy, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 569 (2010).
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egregious cases, the SEC's systematic involvement in substantive restructuring matters
beyond disclosure monitoring and anti-fraud activities threatens the efficient and equitable
administration of bankruptcy cases. 269 Furthering this view, Professor Kelli Alces argued
that the SEC should focus its limited resources on non-bankrupt companies and remain on
the sidelines in bankruptcy cases, where other systems are in place to protect investors.2 70
While the theoretical question of proper interagency balance remains unresolved, the
SEC's conduct in recent years suggests that public equity investors cannot reasonably rely
upon the agency to represent their interests in large commercial bankruptcies. The SEC's
intervention in Chapter 11 cases remains the exception rather than the rule, particularly in
those jurisdictions that regularly hear large commercial bankruptcy cases. 271 The SEC is
not equipped to serve as a potential source of representation for public shareholders in
Chapter 11 cases. Alistaire Bambach, Chief Bankruptcy Counsel to the Division of
Enforcement of the SEC, recently explained that a "small group of dedicated bankruptcy
lawyers .. . work at the [SEC]: fewer than 20, including about four appellate lawyers." 2 72
In sum, the traditional legal structures simply do not provide adequate representation
to the debtor's widely dispersed common equity owners. As a result, the collective action
obstacles shareholders of large corporations face are significantly magnified upon the
corporation's filing for bankruptcy protection. Shareholders continue to face the
difficulties of organizing widely dispersed owners with divergent economic interests, no
longer the exclusive beneficiary of corporate fiduciary duties. In addition, they are
frequently denied the benefit of an official committee to engage in Chapter 11 plan
negotiations. Indeed, the courts most likely to hear large commercial bankruptcy cases are
the most hostile to requests by shareholders to appoint official equity committees. Even
where official committees theoretically exist to promote equity security holders' interests,
these representative bodies are vulnerable to capture by dominant interests and may not be
responsive to the needs of widely dispersed common shareholders. Finally, attempts to
solicit support from the U.S. Trustee, the bankruptcy court and the SEC are generally
unsuccessful. Thus, notwithstanding the Williams court's optimistic belief that
shareholders can be adequately represented even without the ready seat at the bankruptcy
negotiation table that only an official equity committee can provide, 273 shareholders are
systematically disenfranchised. And, without a voice in the proceeding, it is highly unlikely
that they will successfully advance arguments or negotiate to receive a distribution. In
essence, they are effectively subject to a preemptive cram down-albeit without the
limitations and procedural protections envisioned for such a drastic mechanism.
Eastman Kodak Company shareholder Robert Saikaley eloquently captured the
predicament of individual common shareholders of large, publicly traded debtor
269. See generally Skeel, supra note 263 (discussing the SEC's governance experiments in the WorldCom
and Parmalat cases).
270. Kelli A. Alces, Limiting the SEC's Role in Bankruptcy, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 631, 631 (2010).
271. See supra notes 264-266 and accompanying text (noting the SEC's roles in some of these jurisdictions).
272. Alistaire Bambach, The SEC in Bankruptcy: Past and Present, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 607, 607
(2010).
273. See In re Williams Commc'ns Grp., 281 B.R. 216, 223 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[E]ven those equity
holders who do expect a distribution in the case can adequately represent their interest without an official
committee and can seek compensation if they make a substantial contribution in the case.").
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corporations: "Our interest has not been looked after [during the pendency of the Chapter
11 case]; not by the Trustee, not by the CEO, not by the SEC, and nor the [Board of
Directors] either . . . . We have been ignored at every turn." 274 Nonetheless, many
individual common shareholders refused to remain silenced and strived to resist the cram
down by continuing to engage in direct action and grassroots organization for the duration
of the Chapter 11 case. The following Subparts explore how and why these individual
common shareholders continued to strive to gain a seat at the bankruptcy negotiation table,
notwithstanding the failure of traditional legal structures to meet their needs.
III. THE ROLE OF GRASSROOTS SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
The story of Eastman Kodak Company shareholders' efforts to gain a voice in the
bankruptcy and resist the cram down illustrates the ways in which individual common
shareholders use direct action and grassroots organization to try to overcome their
collective action obstacles. As noted above, common shareholders began to interact online
via message boards early in the case, 2 75 hoping to obtain a seat at the negotiation table by
persuading the U.S. Trustee and the court to appoint an official equity committee. The
debtor and its creditors, and ultimately the U.S. Trustee and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York, all claimed that equity security holders had no
meaningful economic interest in the restructuring. 276 But shareholders believed that there
was significant equity value in the corporation; and, at the very least, that the debtor's
financial disclosures were incomplete, inaccurate or misleading because they failed to
reflect the fair market value of substantial portions of the estate.2 77 The shareholders'
requests were twice denied, as the court relied upon Williams to deny the "extraordinary
relief' of an official equity committee. 278
Even now, in the wake of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, it is difficult to know who
was right and who was wrong with respect to Eastman Kodak Company's equity value.
What is clear is that the court made no substantive determination, even though the debtor's
valuation essentially provided the legal basis for denying shareholders a seat at the
negotiation table. 2 79 Under the modem jurisprudence, the debtor simply enjoyed the
benefit of the doubt, while shareholders shouldered a nearly impossible burden of proof.
274. S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity Comm., In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2013), ECF No. 4407.
275. See, e.g., Kodak Shareholders' Blog, http://kodak.boards.net/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (establishing
a web forum for individual shareholders of Eastman Kodak Company during the pendency of its Chapter 11 case).
276. See supra notes 102-106 and sources cited therein (articulating this basic argument against the
formation of an official equity committee).
277. S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity Comm., In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2013), ECF No. 4407.
278. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202 (ALG), 2013 WL 4413300, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15,
2013).
279. Recall that in its consideration of shareholders' first request for an official equity committee, the
Eastman Kodak court declined to consider shareholders' evidence of the debtor's solvency. It noted that "[a]ny
potential benefit to conducting [a valuation trial] is outweighed by the considerable time and expense it would
impose on Kodak at this stage of its reorganization." In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202, 2012 WL 2501071,
at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2012). In its consideration of shareholders' second request for an official equity
committee, the court heard testimony with respect to the debtor's valuation, but ultimately excluded much of the
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Following the court's second denial of an official equity committee in Eastman
Kodak, shareholders continued their attempts to participate in the case and resist the cram
down, but remained wholly reliant from that point forward on their direct action and
grassroots organization. Through these efforts, they worked to advance two arguments:
that some of the debtor's creditors were engaged in insider trading in Eastman Kodak
Company bonds and should therefore have their claims set aside, 280 and that the debtor's
proposed Chapter 11 plan ought not be confirmed because it failed to meet statutory
requirements. 28 1 Perhaps evidencing the difficulty-even for expressly enumerated parties
in interest-of successfully advancing substantive arguments in Chapter 11 cases without
a seat at the negotiation table, neither argument gained any traction in court. In fact, within
days of denying the shareholders' second request for an official equity committee, the court
confirmed the debtor's proposed Chapter 11 plan over the shareholders' objections. 282
The fact that individual common shareholders were largely denied meaningful
representation and forced to engage in grassroots activism in their final, unsuccessful push
to advance their interests reminds us that there are a variety of ways in which bankruptcy
law privileges economic efficiency goals at the expense of procedural fairness. It also
reveals how firms and their dominant stakeholders use Chapter 11 to exploit weaker
constituents who lack a ready seat at the negotiation table and who naturally have a difficult
time mobilizing on their own behalf. Granted, shareholders' collective action obstacles are
not limited to Chapter 11 or the bankruptcy context more broadly.2 83 What is noteworthy,
however, is that shareholders must overcome these enormous obstacles simply to contest
the legal basis and economic justifications for disenfranchising shareholders of bankrupt
companies in the first place. The frustratingly circular logic effectively sends shareholders
down the proverbial rabbit hole, leaving more powerful parties free to allocate the
company's economic value amongst themselves.
shareholders' evidence. See supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text (describing the court's lack of
appreciation for the grassroots efforts of shareholders). In its latter decision, the court ruled that the moving
shareholders had not met their burden of demonstrating that they would be entitled to a meaningful distribution.
In re Eastman Kodak Co., 2013 WL 4413300, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013). It reached this decision by
relying upon the debtor's own projections and asset valuations, as well as midpoints of aggregated estimated
claims-the very same inputs that the shareholders sought to contest. Id. at *3. Thus, the court never needed to
make a more precise substantive determination regarding the debtor's valuation. Id. at *7 (concluding that
"[b]ased on the foregoing, there is no evidence that the Debtor or creditors are hiding value or that an equity
committee would be appropriate, much less 'necessary' in Kodak's case").
280. See, e.g., Letter from Dave M. Dayon to Judge Gropper re: Equity Committee/Bond Trading, In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2013), ECF No. 3774 (establishing
these arguments earlier in the case).
281. Objection by Greg Armstrong, S'holder (Pro Se) to the First Amended Joint Chapter II Plan of
Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and Its Debtor Affiliates, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), ECF No. 4737.
282. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and Its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter II of the Bankr. Code
Chapter 11, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2013), ECF No.
4966.
283. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 37, at 719 ("The shareholder collective action problem is blamed for many
shortcomings of corporate law.").
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Relying upon the qualitative case study method, this Part develops a deeper
understanding of the methods and motivations of grassroots shareholder activism in large
commercial bankruptcies. Specifically, it draws upon direct observation of grassroots
shareholder activism, 2 84 in-depth interviews with grassroots shareholder activists, and
analysis of documents produced and disseminated by activists. This Article discusses the
Eastman Kodak Company bankruptcy as a case study because it is a recent large
commercial case in which parties, including individual common shareholders, actively
litigated the potential appointment of an official equity committee. I reviewed the
company's bankruptcy case docket, conducted searches and analyzed documents that
individual common shareholders filed. I identified potential interview respondents through
their filings made on the case docket and by postings on message boards operated by
shareholders.2 85 I engaged in multiple readings of documents, correspondence and web
postings in an effort to identify common themes. 286 In particular, my analysis focused on
the factors that influenced the shareholders' decisions to engage in direct action and
grassroots organization, the methods they utilized, and the difficulties they encountered in
the course of the bankruptcy case. As the following Subparts reveal, themes such as unjust
corporate enrichment and abuse of legal process by dominant stakeholders emerged. These
findings invite a reexamination of ownership and control in the modern corporation, as
well as a reconsideration of the ways in which corporate and bankruptcy laws privilege
dominant stakeholders in times of corporate financial distress.
A. Motivations for Grassroots Shareholder Activism
The following Subparts outline several broad themes regarding the motivations for
grassroots organization and direct action by the Eastman Kodak Company shareholders I
encountered. First, these shareholders did not merely view themselves as detached and
passive investors, but rather as true owners of the company. Second, while most of them
sensed that Chapter 11 case outcomes reflect the relative market power of corporate
stakeholders, they nonetheless felt a strong desire to participate in the restructuring because
of their longstanding relationship with the company. In other words, while the shareholders
I encountered seemed acutely aware of the difficulties they faced in attempting to influence
the proceedings, they felt motivated to make a last ditch effort of sorts to defend their
ownership interest.
284. This Article relies upon a relatively small number of observations, mostly arising from the same case
study. This so-called small-N problem has been explored in social science literature on qualitative methodology.
See generally James Mahoney, Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 122
(2007) (discussing the new emphasis on publications using qualitative methodology and small-N methods in the
field of comparative politics).
285. Specifically, I contacted prospective interview respondents via the e-mail addresses included on their
court filings, and/or through the private messaging systems on online message boards.
286. Identifying common themes across qualitative data sources-such as field notes, interview transcripts,
or documents-is a recognized qualitative research method. See, e.g., MATTHEW B. MLES ET AL., QUALITATIVE
DATA ANALYSIS: A METHODS SOURCEBOOK 277-80 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing strategies for identifying themes
by drawing from a variety of qualitative data sources).
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1. Shareholder Perceptions Regarding the Meaning ofEquity Ownership in the Modern
Corporation
The individual common shareholders encountered in this project seemed to
understand that equity investments are inherently risky. However, they perceived
themselves to be owners of the bankrupt company and held firmly to this role. Although
they seemed to implicitly recognize that ownership and control are separated in the modern
corporation, 287 such that shareholders cannot make decisions on behalf of the company,
they expected to have their interests taken into consideration throughout its lifespan. For
example, an individual common shareholder of Eastman Kodak Company reminded the
court: "Until this bankruptcy is settled, we the Kodak shareholders OWN this company.
As owners, it is only just to allow our voices to be heard in its path to reorganization." 28 8
While no shareholder articulated an expectation to receive any sort of guaranteed return on
his or her investment in Eastman Kodak Company, all of the shareholders encountered in
this study expressed a demand for adequate representation. The shareholders believed that
they were either steered by faithless fiduciaries 289 or that they were entirely left without
representation.29 0 As the following Subpart explores, these shareholders sensed that parties
with more affluence had an easier time gaining influence in the case.
2. Shareholder Perceptions Regarding the Relationship Between Market Power and
Influence
The shareholders encountered seemed to be acutely aware that unequal market power
in the capital and securities markets impacts relative influence in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Indeed, this is not a new phenomenon, and bankruptcy courts are not the only setting
wherein affluence seems to positively correlate with influence. 29 1 Nonetheless, most
shareholders mentioned at least one economic power dynamic that had the potential to
impact the proceedings, and many expressed frustration that the commercial restructuring
process under Chapter 11 seemed to reward powerful actors. For instance, in a lively
objection, one shareholder remarked:
It is truly fascinating to watch the large players in our financial markets, the
management of our largest publicly-traded companies, highly-paid attomey and
professional advisors, our courts, and our government oversight offices in action.
But it really isn't funny, either to me or to the countless other individuals whose
287. See supra note 36 and sources cited therein (highlighting that stockholders do not have "legal control"
over corporations, even if they enjoy distributed ownership).
288. Letter from Anthony Pillari to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2013), ECF No. 4406.
289. See, e.g., supra note 68 and source cited therein (showing the shareholders' request for an Official
Equity Committee to "protect the interest of common shareholders." Ahsan Zia, on behalf of the other non-insider
common shareholders, discusses that little to no communication has been had between them and the ad hoc
committee, and the shareholders feared they were being deliberately steered in a way that would inevitably impair
their interests.).
290. Supra note 274 and accompanying text.
291. For a fascinating, award-winning study of the phenomenon, see GILENS, supra note 22 (showing and
explaining the pattems of political representation seen in America over the past several decades and how the
public's policy preferences relate to the actual policies that political representatives adopt in Washington).
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lives are being direly [sic] and detrimentally affected by what transpires in these
cases.292
Frustrated by the perceived injustice of a Chapter 11 plan that contemplated cancelling
the debtor's existing equity interests, the shareholder wished that the company's
management would stand up for shareholders and "[t]ell the hyenas from Wall Street to go
chew on some other carcass." 2 93 Similarly, reacting to the obvious power differentials
within the case, another shareholder succinctly summarized his investment-backed
expectations for a level playing field: "I am a single common shareholder that believes in
the notion that the equity markets, which Eastman Kodak and many other iconic companies
are traded in, are fair and transparent." 294 At the same time, he warned that if justice did
not ultimately prevail in the case, it would send a powerfully negative signal to public
investors everywhere:
If Wall Street, the governing regulators, and the US [sic] Court System want to
promote confidence and transparency among the markets, whether it's in the
equity, bond, or debt markets, retail common shareholders need to be reassured
that they are not being exploited, otherwise the whole process and idea of having
open markets will never succeed.295
Although the shareholders encountered seemed to recognize that they faced a
substantial uphill battle to gain influence in the case, many communicated their belief that
a primary role of the bankruptcy court-as a court of law responsible for the administration
of the case-was to protect the public investors' interests. One Eastman Kodak Company
shareholder explained: "We need our voices heard your Honour to protect the interests of
common shareholders [and] we need justice to prevail in your courtroom." 296 Indeed, many
of the filings made by individual common shareholders included an explicit prayer for
"justice."297
On one hand, some Eastman Kodak Company shareholders felt compelled to
implicitly or explicitly acknowledge that they were not part of the powerful, economic
elite, perhaps in the hopes that the court might be sympathetic to their interests and more
inclined to take a protective stance. To this end, some shareholders mentioned their familial
and socioeconomic circumstances. One shareholder referred to himself as a "family man
292. Objection by Greg Armstrong, S'holder (Pro Se) to the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and Its Debtor Affiliates, at 1, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-
10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), ECF No. 4737.
293. Id. at 50.
294. Letter from Dave M. Dayon to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2013), ECF No. 3774.
295. Id.
296. S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity Comm. at 2, In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013), ECF No. 4407.
297. See, e.g., Objection by Greg Armstrong, S'holder (Pro Se) to the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and its Debtor Affiliates, at 3, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-
10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), ECF No. 4737 ("I firmly believe that 'justice' is the ultimate aim
of our laws."); S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity Comm., at 2, In
re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013), ECF No. 4249 ("What kind
ofjustice is this? Yourhonor, we need you to serve real justice and protect the interest of common shareholders.").
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with two very young children." 2 98 Another explained: "Your honor, I may be from a poor
family of 8 children from Rochester, New York but my parents did not raise a dummy." 29 9
The shareholder went on to request:
In the name of truth, justice and the AMERICAN WAY ... [sic] I ask for an
Equity Committee to be appointed as soon as possible so that the citizens of the
world can see that the United States protects the rights of the individuals . . . [sic]
even against a bevy of armies ... all armed with high paid attorneys. 300
On the other hand, shareholders at times attempted to establish and invoke their own
individual or combined economic power by referencing their relatively large share
holdings. One shareholder made reference to his "16,250 shares of common stock" in
Eastman Kodak Company;30 1 another mentioned the "many other shareholders who hold
many millions of shares." 302 Yet another shareholder referenced her large number of equity
shares held in multiple accounts. 303
Finally, some shareholders attempted to appeal to the judge's sympathies by
articulating their emotional reactions to the Chapter 11 proceedings. One shareholder
noted: "Your Honour, Kodak common shareholders have been suffering financially and
emotionally for many years with the most suffering brought on by the debtor's bankruptcy
filing."3 04 Another shareholder addressed the bankruptcy judge thusly: "You are a kind
and compassionate man and we appreciate the time you have spent reading our letters and
listening to our pain." 305 Yet another shareholder explained, "I have worked very hard all
my life as a nursing supervisor and now as a private duty nurse. I am 63 years old and my
retirement money is 95% in KODAK." 30 6 However, the strongest emotional responses
tended to focus upon shareholders' unwavering dedication to, and passion for, the bankrupt
company, either because of their longstanding history as an investor or, in some cases, as
an employee of Eastman Kodak Company. The following Subpart considers these
motivations in greater detail.
298. Letter from Joseph Dallal to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013), ECF No. 4398.
299. Letter from Nancy Bo to Judge Allan Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013), ECF No. 4409.
300. Id
301. Letter from Mark Bolivar to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013), ECF No. 4266.
302. Letter from Anthony Pillari to Judge Allan L. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013), ECF No. 4406.
303. E-mail from Nancy Bo to Judge Allan L. Gropper and the U.S. Trustee, (May 21, 2013) (on file with
the author).
304. S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity Comm., at 3, In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013), ECF No. 4249.
305. Letter from Matt Glassman to Judge Gropper re: Unsecured Creditors/S'holders at 1, In re Eastman
Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013), ECF No. 4714.
306. E-mail from Nancy Bo to Judge Allan L. Gropper and the U.S. Trustee (May 21, 2013) (on file with
the author).
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3. Shareholders' Loyalty to the Debtor Corporation
Another theme that emerged from my research is that deep and longstanding loyalty
to Eastman Kodak Company seemed to motivate individual common shareholders to
attempt to influence the bankruptcy proceedings. Many of the shareholders I encountered
expressed a belief that the company's common equity owners had been more loyal to the
company than any other stakeholders, including its officers and directors. For instance, a
shareholder closed one of his letters to the court with the declaration: "Kodak's future is
bright and us loyal shareholders deserve to be a part of it." 30 7 Another shareholder pleaded
with the court to "protect our interest, to protect the future of thousands of American
families, to protect those who bought Kodak, and want to move with Kodak in the
future." 308 Yet another explained: "I am a construction inspector, and I understand how
difficult and sometimes pointless it is to go against the grain. I fight the fight. I also worked
at Kodak as a younger man."309 In the same letter, the shareholder referenced Eastman
Kodak Company as "our company," and reminded the court of the company's motto.3 10
Another shareholder implicated the passion and charisma of the company's founder,
George Eastman, quoting his biography in an e-mail to the judge and concluding: "I feel
with all my heart, mind and soul that George Eastman would be standing up for his
shareholders." 3 1 1
Perhaps it was this unyielding loyalty and dedication that emboldened so many of the
company's individual common shareholders to engage in the process of mobilization. They
were driven to take on this challenge notwithstanding the pronounced obstacles they faced
under modem corporate and bankruptcy laws. The following Subpart considers the
methods used by individual common shareholders in their attempts to gain a meaningful
voice in Eastman Kodak.
B. Methods of Grassroots Shareholder Activism
Once individual common shareholders decide to participate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings, they face a number of practical limitations in addition to the collective action
and legal obstacles set forth in previous sections. For one thing, individual common
shareholders are frequently unable to depend upon attorneys, accountants, and other
professionals to develop and refine their arguments. This is because, without the
appointment of an official equity committee, shareholders are unlikely to receive
reimbursement of costs and expenses from the bankruptcy estate.3 12 Moreover, because
large, publicly traded debtors and their creditors typically engage the most prominent
307. Letter from Kenneth Heinlein to Judge Allan J. Gropper, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013), ECF No. 4233.
308. S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment of an Official Equity Comm., at 3, In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013), ECF No. 4249.
309. Letter from Mark Bolivar to Judge Allan L. Gropper, at 1, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-
10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013), ECF No. 4266.
310. Id.
311. E-mail from Nancy Bo to Judge Allan L. Gropper and the U.S. Trustee (May 21, 2013) (on file with
the author).
312. See supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text (explaining why ad hoc committees and individual
interest holders have difficulties receiving reimbursements from bankruptcy estates).
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professionals in a relatively small commercial restructuring service industry, shareholders
may have a difficult time finding professionals who possess the experience and industry
recognition needed to impress the court. Indeed, these challenges were fully evident in
Eastman Kodak.3 13
Thus, individual common shareholders tend to do their own research using primary
and secondary sources, materials produced by other parties, and data collected via the
Internet. 3 14 At times, they also contact other persons involved in the case for assistance.
For example, an Eastman Kodak Company shareholder explained that he "followed the
case through .. .KCC, [an online claims agent website that includes the case docket], [and]
had one phone conversation with the US [sic] Trustee's office." 3 15 Some even reached out
to shareholders who attempted to intervene in other large corporate bankruptcies in an
effort to learn from their experiences. For example, a poster on an online message board
for Eastman Kodak Company shareholders noted that he "just got off the phone with [a]
shareholder who was involved with several chapter 11 cases in the past, and is a holder of
Kodak." 3 16
The shareholders I encountered tended to use data and information in natural and
spontaneous ways to support their claims and assertions. For instance, one shareholder
cited an earlier opinion of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
in the hopes that it would bolster her arguments. 317 Meanwhile, a different shareholder
chose to append secondary articles, written by practicing attorneys, summarizing the
grounds for appointment of official equity committees.3 18 Another excerpted news articles
in his letter to document potential insider trading by certain creditors in the case. 3 19 Yet
another shareholder filed a multi-part analysis challenging the debtor's valuation of the
company by drawing upon the debtor's own admissions reflected elsewhere on the docket,
in publicly available data,3 20 and in secondary sources.32 1
313. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (evidencing the stark contrast drawn by the court between
the debtor's experts and those hired by shareholders).
314. For instance, individual common shareholders participating in an online message board conducted
Internet searches to determine comparable real property valuations in Rochester, New York, and compared such
data to the debtor's own valuation data. See it2012, Price per acre in Rochester = 2-5 million per acre, KODAK-
SHAREHOLDERS.COM (June 24, 2013, 9:51 AM), http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5973/price-acre-rochester-2-5
(pondering property values in Rochester).
315. Interview with Greg Armstrong (Dec. 6, 2013) (on file with the author).
316. Admin, Insider Trading Letter Docket 3774 Has Hit!, KODAK-SHAREHOLDERS.COM (May 24, 2013,
8:00 AM), http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5595/insider-trading-letter-docket-3774.
317. Letter from Nancy Bo to Judge Allan Gropper, at 1-2, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202
(ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2013), ECF No. 4409.
318. S'holders' Motion for an Order Approving the Appointment ofan Official Equity Comm., at 22-25, In
re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 9, 2013), ECF No. 4249.
319. Letter from Dave M. Dayon to Judge Gropper re: Equity Committee/Bond Trading, at 1-2, In re
Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2013), ECF No. 3774 (excerpting a
Business Wire article reporting on an Eastman Kodak Company bond offering).
320. The previously referenced shareholder also utilized publicly available data, drawing data points from
the debtor's previous SEC disclosures to bolster his arguments. Id (citing to the debtor's SEC filings).
321. See, e.g., Props. Worldwide, Plants Worldwide, Blds. Worldwide & Equip. Worldwide Filed by Robert
Saikaley, at 2, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2013), ECF No.
4234 (listing some of the debtors' properties and raising questions about their assessment).
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As noted above, the shareholders I encountered seemed to rely largely upon the
Internet to come together and brainstorm possible arguments and strategies. At times,
shareholders crowdsourced3 22 their analyses, contributing their own expertise or enlisting
volunteer assistance from friends, relatives, and other shareholders. For instance, Eastman
Kodak Company shareholder and Scribd.com user "stockboardguy" provided form letters
and filings through an online digital library, which other shareholders could then modify
as needed, print, sign, and add to the case docket. 323 Similarly, a poster on an online
message board prepared a form letter to the U.S. Trustee to encourage other Eastman
Kodak Company shareholders to sign and send under their own names. 324
However, while individual common shareholders face tremendous practical
limitations in their efforts to synthesize data and develop responses, many are nonetheless
able to conduct highly sophisticated analyses on their own behalf Many Eastman Kodak
Company shareholders demonstrated extensive familiarity with the case docket using the
defined terms established across hundreds of complex documents prepared on behalf of the
debtor by leading commercial law firms. For example, a form letter drafted by an individual
shareholder concisely summarized key aspects of the debtor's proposed Chapter 11 plan
including an exhibit cross-referencing dozens of docketed items. 325 Similarly, shareholder
James Hurst filed his own alternative Chapter 11 plan, addressing the highly nuanced
federal income tax consequences of the debtor's proposed plan. 32 6 And shareholder Greg
Armstrong filed a thorough and well-written objection to the debtor's proposed plan, which
raised a number of important questions with respect to the debtor's valuation of its assets,
the transfer of non-debtor property as part of the reorganization, and related concerns. 32 7
Nonetheless, as explained in previous sections, individual common shareholders were
unsuccessful in their attempts to influence the proceedings in Eastman Kodak. Without a
seat at the negotiation table, their "party in interest" status under the Bankruptcy Code
meant very little: they simply did not have a meaningful platform from which they could
effectively raise substantive arguments. In essence, the denial of an official equity
committee had the practical effect of preemptively cramming them down. Accordingly, the
322. The term "crowdsourcing" refers to the practice of solving problems or achieving project goals by
soliciting contributions from large and diverse pools of individuals working remotely and collaborating via the
Internet. See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l4.06/crowds.html (explaining the practice and relating successful
"crowdsourcing" stories); see also, e.g., Jerry Brito, Hack Mash, & Peer: Crowdsourcing Government
Transparency, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 119 (2008) (providing an overview of "crowdsourcing" and
detailing the methods generally used by individuals crowdsourcing a solution to a problem).
323. STOCKBOARDGUY'S PROFILE, http://www.scribd.com/stockboardguy/documents (last visited Sept. 11,
2014).
324. CSwift71, Insider Trading Letter Docket 3774 Has Hit!, KODAK-SHAREHOLDERS.COM (May 22, 2013,
12:08 PM), http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5595/insider-trading-letter-docket-3774.
325. Stockboardguy, Objection Letter-13, SCRIBD.COM (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/l60072394/Objection-Letter-13.
326. Objection by James E. Hurst to the First Amended Plan of Reorganization and Proposed First
Alternative Plan of Reorganization, at 1, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Jul. 8, 2013), ECF No. 4247.
327. Objection by Greg Armstrong, S'holder (Pro Se) to the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and Its Debtor Affiliates, at 4-24, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-
10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), ECF No. 4737.
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court approved the debtor's proposed Chapter 11 plan without modifications to address the
substantive issues raised in the shareholders' many letters, motions, and objections. It
seems that modem corporate and bankruptcy law-particularly in the wake of Williams-
has erected a virtually insurmountable barrier to entry for individual common shareholders
in most cases. And so, the victory of economic efficiency arguments in Chapter 11 comes
at the expense of shareholders' procedural and substantive rights. The following Subpart
provides a postscript of sorts, which considers the reactions of individual common
shareholders to the Eastman Kodak Company restructuring.
C. A Postscript to Eastman Kodak: Shareholder Responses to the Restructuring Outcome
Over the many objections of common shareholders, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York approved Eastman Kodak Company's proposed Chapter
11 plan in August 2013.328 The shareholders I encountered in this project, like all of the
company's historical equity owners, were wiped out in the restructuring. 329 Meanwhile,
the reorganized Eastman Kodak Company commenced trading on the New York Stock
Exchange under the ticker "KODK," reaching a 52-week high of $37.73 per share in early
2014.
Although we might expect shareholders to regret losing their financial investment, the
reactions of some shareholders to the Eastman Kodak Company restructuring primarily
centered upon their feelings of frustration with a process that they perceive to be extremely
unfair. When asked how well the process met the needs of individual common shareholders
during the bankruptcy, one shareholder responded that the process treated the shareholders
"[w]ith complete and total disdain." 330 He further stated that "the process was not fair, at
all."33 1 In the wake of this experience, he has lost his faith in the U.S. financial markets:
"Wall Street won't be getting any more of my money." 332 More recently, he explained:
"The Kodak bankruptcy shook (and in fact shattered) the very foundation of my belief [in
the] system as it concerns our nation's principles, its laws, and the application of those
laws." 333 A poster on an online message board for Eastman Kodak Company shareholders
remarked in response to the query "Has anyone learned anything from this experience that
we can apply to the next investment opportunity?" the following: "the market is corrupt
and manipulated. . . but pretty much knew that already. This was just another reminder." 334
328. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Co. and Its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code Chapter 11, at 64, In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2013),
ECF No. 4966 [hereinafter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order]; see also, e.g., Nick Brown, US.
Judge Approves Kodak Plan to Exit Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/20/us-kodak-idUSBRE97JOW820130820?feedType=RSS&feedName=businessNews (reporting
that U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper approved Kodak's bankruptcy plan).
329. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, supra note 328, at 35-36.
330. Interview with Greg Armstrong (Dec. 6,2013) (on file with author).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Interview with Greg Armstrong (Feb. 20, 2014) (on file with author).
334. CSwift7l, Reply to Has Anyone Learned Anything?, KODAK-SHAREHOLDERS.COM (Sept. 9, 2013,
9:23AM), http://kodak.boards.net/thread/6540/learned.
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Similarly, another Eastman Kodak Company shareholder summarized her experience
during the Chapter 11 bankruptcy thusly: "COMPLETE frustration, exasperation,"
remarking that she should have known better.335 Reflecting upon her attempts to gain
influence in the proceedings, she mused, "It was the old boys network hard at work. I was
out of my league." 3 36 Further reinforcing the view that the individual common
shareholders who participated in the case were not simply hoping to be made whole, this
respondent was fully prepared to acknowledge that the company was no longer worth as
much as it had been in its heyday: "[T]here was value there. My shares were worth at least
.50 a share at the time." 3 37 This valuation estimate is, of course, a far cry from the
company's $90 trading range in better days. 3 38
In sum, the Eastman Kodak Company shareholders I encountered do not merely
shoulder the disappointment of their substantial investment losses and any additional
expenses they incurred in their self-advocacy efforts. They must also grapple with their
deeply held belief that the legal system failed them. Many of the shareholders have largely
integrated and moved on from the former, but have not even begun to recover from the
latter. The following Part strives to carry the torch on their behalf, recommending legal
reforms that might help to make the system more equitable for future investors of publicly
traded companies who someday find themselves unwitting parties in interest to a Chapter
11 bankruptcy case.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEGAL REFORM
This Article reveals why and how individual common shareholders of large corporate
debtors increasingly use grassroots organization and direct action to attempt to overcome
both their pronounced collective action obstacles and the effect of laws that systematically
exclude them from the Chapter 11 negotiation table. At the same time, the analysis
demonstrates how these mobilization efforts are simply not enough to enable common
shareholders with small holdings to gain a voice in Chapter 11 proceedings and negotiate
for better treatment. Without a seat at the negotiation table, it is extremely difficult for them
to successfully advance arguments or bargain to receive a distribution. In effect, they are
preemptively crammed down. Therefore, legal interventions are needed to address
shareholder disenfranchisement and restore fairness in Chapter 11.
These reforms are important because, if shareholders are permitted to fully participate
in the bankruptcy case, they will be better able to protect their substantive rights-such as
by challenging questionable valuations and raising other arguments in the case-and
perhaps even recover some value on account of their interests. While it is true that in some
cases the settlements ultimately offered to shareholders on account of their equity interests
335. Interview with Nancy Bo (Jan. 2, 2014) (on file with author).
336. Id.
337. Id
338. See Eastman Kodak Co. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 18 (Mar. 11, 1998) (noting a high price per
share for the first quarter 1997 of $94.75).
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will be in violation of the absolute priority rule, 3 39 the mere prospect of such distributions
in some cases should not justify the presumptive exclusion of an entire class of interest
holders in all cases. In light of the pronounced collective action obstacles and other special
challenges the debtor's widely dispersed common shareholders face,340 bankruptcy law
should tilt the scales back in their favor.
First and foremost, shareholders should have a seat at the bankruptcy negotiation
table. As one conceivable solution, Congress could mandate the appointment of official
equity committees instead of leaving the appointment within the discretion of the U.S.
Trustee and the courts. 34 1 Of course, this solution has the potential to be overbroad. A
mandate of this sort would lead to the appointment of official equity committees even in
those cases where the debtor is indisputably insolvent from the outset, such that creditors
would clearly bear the costs of formal equity representation. Under these circumstances,
an equity committee would only further deplete what little remains of the bankruptcy
estate, while contributing additional uncertainty to the process. 342
In lieu of mandating the appointment of official equity committees in all cases,
Congress could essentially overrule Williams by directing the U.S. Trustee and the
bankruptcy court to entirely disregard the debtor's solvency when determining whether to
appoint an official equity committee. Instead, the decision to appoint an official equity
committee would be made based upon the nature of the restructuring. For instance,
Congress could mandate the appointment of official equity committees for all Chapter 11
cases other than those that feature liquidating plans. Presumably, the potential for
manipulation of valuation data is the highest in public company cases that contemplate that
the historic shareholders will be wiped out and that other stakeholders will succeed to the
equity position in the reorganized company.343 These are also the cases in which
shareholders are most likely to believe that they are being exploited, and where shareholder
collective action obstacles are the greatest. This reform would go a long way towards
fortifying shareholder rights, at the same time alleviating all parties from the burden of
adjudicating the solvency question at the commencement of the case for the narrow purpose
of determining whether to appoint an official equity committee. Of course, in many
reorganization cases, the debtor will be hopelessly and indisputably insolvent, such that the
ongoing involvement of an official equity committee would constitute a clear drain on the
estate. In such cases, Professors LoPucki and Whitford's proposal for a preemptive cram
down-with its attendant limitations and safeguards-would be an effective way to
339. We can assume such payments would be similar to those identified in a sample of 43 large commercial
bankruptcy cases studied by LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 79, at 143-58 (documenting the relatively small
settlements received by shareholders on account of their equity interests).
340. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-989, at 5796 (1978) (explaining that there is a "natural tendency of a debtor in
distress to pacify large creditors with whom the debtor would expect to do business at the expense of small and
scattered public investors").
341. A revision of this sort would be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1102. Instead of providing only for the
discretionary appointment of official equity committees, the statute would read as follows: "the United States
trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and a committee of equity security
holders."
342. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 53, at 706 (highlighting the various forms of mischief that official
committees can introduce to a corporate restructuring).
343. See generally O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 414-27.
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alleviate some of the burden by extinguishing the official equity committee's role in the
case. 344
As the least radical alternative, discretion to appoint an official equity committee may
continue to reside in the U.S. Trustee and the bankruptcy courts, with the debtor's solvency
still part of the analysis. But Congress or the courts ought to reject the Williams line of
reasoning and return to a more shareholder-friendly standard governing the appointment
of official equity committees in Chapter 11 cases. 345 Moreover, rather than forcing
shareholders to engage in the impracticable task of putting forth their own valuation case,
Congress or the courts could make it clear that shareholders need only raise a colorable
claim that it cannot be determined at the commencement of the bankruptcy case whether
the debtor is in fact balance sheet insolvent. 346 When considering shareholder requests for
an official equity committee, bankruptcy courts should be required to view the evidence
and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to shareholders. In
practical terms, given that the debtor's financial disclosures are typically riddled with
caveats that the information may be incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading, such a standard
would force the debtor who wishes to exclude shareholders from the negotiation table to
stand by its disclosures. By essentially erring on the side of shareholders, such a standard
would more fully take into account the unique collective action obstacles shareholders of
large, publicly traded corporations face, as well as their inability to rely upon
reimbursement of costs and expenses from the bankruptcy estate.
Of course, all of this sidesteps an even more fundamental problem. The appointment
of an official equity committee may not be enough to meet the needs of the special class of
equity security holders that is the subject of this Article: a publicly traded debtor company's
widely dispersed individual common shareholders. Because the largest interest holders
typically comprise official committees, 347 such committees are subject to capture by
dominant shareholders who are likely to have their own divergent and even conflicted
interests in the restructuring. Thus, in all cases, including those where an official equity
committee has been appointed, as well as those that involve hopelessly insolvent debtors,
Congress should authorize the appointment of a special committee or designated trustee to
represent the individual common shareholders' interests. 34 8 This committee or trustee
would possess more limited rights to examine the debtor and engage in plan negotiations
but would nonetheless serve a vital role by communicating with individual shareholders,
responding to their requests for information and support, and monitoring official
committees that purport to advance shareholder interests. At the very least, one or more of
344. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 79, at 187-89; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 113, at 625.
345. In other words, Congress could expressly codify the standard for appointing official equity committees
in the text of 11 U.S.C. § 1102. Or appellate courts-including potentially the Supreme Court-could weigh in,
such as to overturn Williams and its progeny as well as mandate the application of a more lenient standard.
346. In Eastman Kodak, individual common shareholders seem to have clearly met this standard,
demonstrating, among other things, that the debtor's financial statements relied on book values and excluded a
host of vital assets.
347. See 11 U.S.C. § 1 102(b)(2) (providing that the committee should generally be comprised of persons
holding the "seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee").
348. This position could be modeled after that which is proposed in Alces, supra note 37 (exploring the
collective action obstacles shareholders of large corporations face and proposing an "equity trustee" to better
represent their interests).
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the U.S. Trustee offices, the bankruptcy courts, or the SEC should develop a division that
specifically focuses on interfacing with public investors of Chapter 11 debtor corporations
so that their interests are protected in the restructuring process. Special care should also be
taken to ensure that more powerful investors do not take advantage of these resources by
engaging in so-called "astroturfing" 349 to make it seem that more sympathetic shareholders
drive their actions.
These procedural reforms would go a long way towards improving the position of
shareholders of bankrupt companies and alleviating some of the structural strain inherent
in Chapter lI 's process.3 50 But they are also only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Indeed,
as I have argued earlier, Chapter 11 suffers from a number of inequities and
inefficiencies. 351
In particular, Congress and bankruptcy courts should reconsider the system's reliance
on negotiated settlements among dominant parties, as consensus-based and market-based
processes often do nothing more than give powerful actors with existing market power the
opportunity to control case outcomes. 352 And if shareholders-or any other major
corporate claimants or interest holders-are systematically denied a seat at the bankruptcy
negotiation table, then the purported reliance on consensus or market-based mechanisms
to resolve corporate financial distress may be merely illusory. In essence, it may be a
convenient legal fiction that obscures a far less palatable reality.
Congress and the bankruptcy courts should also reassess how Chapter 11 values
debtor corporations. 353 Notwithstanding courts' recognition that GAAP ought not to be
determinative of the debtor's solvency, 354 financial disclosures and solvency
determinations in large commercial bankruptcies continue to rely on these and other
prevailing financial reporting principles. As one possible fix, Congress or the courts could
349. See generally Gabriel H. Markoff, The Invisible Barrier: Issue Exhaustion as a Threat to Pluralism in
Administrative Rulemaking, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1065 (2012) (addressing the risks of so-called "astroturfing,"
concealing the true advocates of a particular cause of action by making it seem as though it originates from
grassroots activists).
350. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (detailing the structural strain that underlies the commercial
bankruptcy process).
351. See generally Dick, supra note 14 (arguing that stakeholders with existing market power take control
of the bankruptcy restructuring process at the expense of other stakeholders); Dick, supra note 28 (making a
similar claim and demonstrating how powerful stakeholders are able to extract excess returns).
352. See Dick, supra note 14 (addressing inequalities of the reorganization process).
353. In fact, in a recent survey of members of the American Bankruptcy Institute's Business Reorganization
Committee, "[m]ost respondents ... agreed with the following statement: 'Additional disclosures made by the
debtor earlier in the case regarding ... asset valuation would help facilitate more effective restructurings." Dalid
Jim6nez, ABI Chapter 11 Survey Results, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 11 (2014).
354. The Ninth Circuit eloquently captured the tension between GAAP and bankruptcy law in declaring that
"[tihe authorities cited by the debtor do not compel the conclusion that the bankruptcy court must follow GAAP
in making solvency determinations. Requiring application of GAAP would make accountants and the board which
promulgate GAAP the arbiters of insolvency questions. Clearly the Code provides that judges should make such
decisions. Furthermore, there is no policy reason why judges should not be allowed to consider subsequent events
such as the actual collection rate for receivables, in valuing assets and determining liabilities. Thus although
GAAP are relevant, they are not controlling in insolvency determinations." In re Sierra Steel, Inc. v. Totten Tubes
Inc., 96 B.R. 275, 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
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mandate that an independent, court-appointed examiner revalue the debtor's assets at fair
market value at the commencement of a Chapter 11 case.
Of course, critics will likely argue that such a move would bring us back to the pre-
1978 system of commercial restructuring, where cases often became mired in valuation
battles. For those who prefer to place their trust in market mechanisms, the present system
at least superficially seems to offer efficient outcomes. 355 But this assurance, while elegant
in its simplicity, ignores a glaring problem: the debtor's valuation is not only a highly
negotiated basis for ultimately distributing value, it is also presently the legal basis for
inviting corporate constituencies to the negotiation table in the first place. Under the
prevailing standard, shareholders cannot access the negotiation process at all unless they
meet their burden of proving the debtor's solvency. For this reason, if the debtor's valuation
is to remain a factor in the analysis, courts must take a more active role in determining
valuation at two critical junctures: (1) at the commencement of the case, when parties are
initially invited to the negotiation table, and (2) at plan confirmation, when value is
ultimately distributed to claimants.
The estate's costs of adequately representing shareholders are, obviously, a concern.
But the administrative burden has not prevented other parties from solidifying their own
seats at the negotiation table. As Eastman Kodak Company shareholders observed early in
the case, "in extremely large cases . . . the debtors, secured lenders and the official
creditors' committee each hire highly expensive counsel, investment bankers, financial and
other advisors," including "the most highly-regarded, and most expensive, law firms in
America." 356 Accordingly, "none should be heard to complain that an Official Equity
Committee will become an overwhelming administrative burden on the estates. Under this
record, the contention is insincere." 357 Bankruptcy law must also take into account the
broader social costs of systematically excluding a vital corporate constituency.
Opportunities for abuse exist wherever persons are authorized to make decisions that
impact others' interests without meaningful checks and balances. The fact that modem
commercial restructurings are large and complex with the potential to be expensive and
time consuming is no justification for continued reliance on a system that so ignores this
basic axiom.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article's view of commercial restructurings under Chapter 11 is not particularly
favorable. Although the Bankruptcy Code's drafters expressed a hope that a commercial
debtor's equity investors would have access to formal representation in Chapter 11
cases, 358 corporate and bankruptcy laws have evolved in such a way that the debtor's non-
355. This is because when parties who are sensitive to transaction costs are encouraged to reach a negotiated
settlement as to the debtor's valuation, they will presumably settle upon a calculation that-although not
necessarily perfectly accurate--comes as close to the economic reality as rational actors would tolerate.
356. Kodak S'holders' Joint Motion, supra note 84, at 20. The shareholders highlight the large fees promised
to certain of these professionals, "including monthly fees of $250,000, a guaranteed transaction fee of $12.5
million, and opportunities to generate other substantial incremental fees." Id.
357. Id.
358. See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate report for the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978).
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insider common shareholders are now largely excluded from the negotiation table. 359
Notwithstanding the Williams court's reassurances, 360 shareholders are unable to rely on
the extant legal structures to protect their interests. As a result, they must engage in direct
action and grassroots organization, often incurring significant personal costs. Even then,
bankruptcy courts can simply choose to block their efforts on the grounds that they must
be sore losers in an otherwise fair investment game. In other words, individual common
shareholders can overcome their collective action obstacles, but they cannot overcome the
legal barriers to full and meaningful participation in the case. Without a meaningful voice
in the proceedings, they are, essentially, crammed down from the case's outset.
As it stands, Chapter Il's commercial restructuring process erodes public faith in the
financial markets. Notwithstanding a dominant economic efficiency paradigm, the
bankruptcy estate's costs of granting meaningful representation cannot justify the
continued disenfranchisement of the debtor's public investors. This is especially true in
cases contemplating that other stakeholders will succeed to the equity position in the
reorganized company. If for no other reason than to help restore the financial markets'
integrity in times of corporate financial distress, shareholders must have a meaningful
opportunity to participate in Chapter 11 restructurings.
359. See supra Part II (discussing the failure of traditional legal structures to promote shareholders'
interests).
360. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (articulating the court's confidence that shareholders would
be represented in the restructuring even without an official equity committee).
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